快讯:营销资产责任制的后果--一个自然实验

IF 11.5 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Journal of Marketing Pub Date : 2024-02-16 DOI:10.1177/00222429241236142
Peter Guenther, Miriam Guenther, Bryan A. Lukas, Christian Homburg
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引用次数: 0

摘要

市场营销学者广泛研究了市场营销对企业价值的影响,并制定了衡量标准和仪表盘,以帮助建立市场营销问责制。然而,有关市场营销问责制具体成果的经验证据却很少,而且主要来自调查。此外,还缺乏对营销职能在企业中的地位以外的结果的考虑,从而忽略了与外部利益相关者(如投资者)有关的可能弊端和结果。本研究利用一个自然实验--澳大利亚从非限制性会计制度向限制性会计制度的转变--研究营销资产财务价值问责制(营销资产问责制)如何影响企业营销管理对短期与长期营销效率的关注、其资本成本以及其股票价格反映未来实际业绩的程度(即股票价格信息性)。结果表明,营销资产责任制提高了长期营销效率,降低了股本成本,提高了股价信息性,但对短期营销效率和债务成本的影响并不一致。此外,尽管营销密集型企业通常被认为从营销资产责任制中获益最多,但事实并非如此。这些结果对研究人员、管理者和公共政策决策者都有借鉴意义。
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EXPRESS: Consequences of Marketing Asset Accountability – a Natural Experiment
Marketing scholars have extensively studied marketing’s effect on firm value and developed metrics and dashboards to help establish marketing accountability. However, empirical evidence of marketing accountability’s specific outcomes is scarce and mainly derived from surveys. It also lacks consideration of outcomes beyond the marketing function’s standing in the firm, thus overlooking possible downsides and outcomes with regard to external stakeholders such as investors. Using a natural experiment — Australia’s change from a non-restrictive to a restrictive accounting regime — this study investigates how accountability for the financial value of marketing assets (marketing asset accountability) affects a firm’s marketing management focus on short-term vis-à-vis long-term marketing efficiency, its cost of capital, and the degree to which its stock price reflects actual future performance (i.e., stock price informativeness). The results show that marketing asset accountability improves long-term marketing efficiency, reduces cost of equity, and improves stock price informativeness, but does not consistently affect short-term marketing efficiency and cost of debt. Moreover, although marketing-intensive firms are commonly assumed to benefit most from marketing asset accountability, this is not the case. These results have implications for researchers, managers, and public policy decision-makers.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
24.10
自引率
5.40%
发文量
49
期刊介绍: Founded in 1936,the Journal of Marketing (JM) serves as a premier outlet for substantive research in marketing. JM is dedicated to developing and disseminating knowledge about real-world marketing questions, catering to scholars, educators, managers, policy makers, consumers, and other global societal stakeholders. Over the years,JM has played a crucial role in shaping the content and boundaries of the marketing discipline.
期刊最新文献
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