{"title":"在线劳动力市场中的实际激励:个人和群体的惩罚与奖励","authors":"Matthew J. Hashim and Jesse C. Bockstedt","doi":"10.25300/misq/2023/15166","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<style>#html-body [data-pb-style=FO0WS48]{justify-content:flex-start;display:flex;flex-direction:column;background-position:left top;background-size:cover;background-repeat:no-repeat;background-attachment:scroll}</style>Online labor markets and the humans that power them serve a critical role in the advancement of artificial intelligence and supervised machine learning via the creation of useful training datasets. The use of human effort in online labor markets is not enough, however, as a key factor is understanding the possible interventions that market operators can leverage to incentivize human effort among their labor force. We propose that platforms could implement mechanisms such as rewards or punishments at individual or group levels to incentivize real-effort and output. We apply our interventions using a collaborative image tagging experiment—a folksonomy—and the results provide interesting insights and nonobvious consequences. On average, interventions applied at the group level outperformed interventions applied at the individual level. Punishing the group provided the most controversial incentive strategy and provided a nonobvious significant improvement in effort. Rewarding or sanctioning an individual had similar effects on average, with both treatments leading to significant increases in effort post-intervention. In contrast to predictions, sanctioning appears to have significantly motivated those that were punished. Overall, the interventions applied in our real-effort collaborative image tagging experiment had a significant impact on behavior, which provides guidance for online labor market operators and the use of incentives in the creation of labeled machine learning training datasets.","PeriodicalId":49807,"journal":{"name":"Mis Quarterly","volume":"2010 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Real-Effort Incentives in Online Labor Markets: Punishments and Rewards for Individuals and Groups\",\"authors\":\"Matthew J. Hashim and Jesse C. Bockstedt\",\"doi\":\"10.25300/misq/2023/15166\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<style>#html-body [data-pb-style=FO0WS48]{justify-content:flex-start;display:flex;flex-direction:column;background-position:left top;background-size:cover;background-repeat:no-repeat;background-attachment:scroll}</style>Online labor markets and the humans that power them serve a critical role in the advancement of artificial intelligence and supervised machine learning via the creation of useful training datasets. The use of human effort in online labor markets is not enough, however, as a key factor is understanding the possible interventions that market operators can leverage to incentivize human effort among their labor force. We propose that platforms could implement mechanisms such as rewards or punishments at individual or group levels to incentivize real-effort and output. We apply our interventions using a collaborative image tagging experiment—a folksonomy—and the results provide interesting insights and nonobvious consequences. On average, interventions applied at the group level outperformed interventions applied at the individual level. Punishing the group provided the most controversial incentive strategy and provided a nonobvious significant improvement in effort. Rewarding or sanctioning an individual had similar effects on average, with both treatments leading to significant increases in effort post-intervention. In contrast to predictions, sanctioning appears to have significantly motivated those that were punished. Overall, the interventions applied in our real-effort collaborative image tagging experiment had a significant impact on behavior, which provides guidance for online labor market operators and the use of incentives in the creation of labeled machine learning training datasets.\",\"PeriodicalId\":49807,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Mis Quarterly\",\"volume\":\"2010 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Mis Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.25300/misq/2023/15166\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Mis Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.25300/misq/2023/15166","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Real-Effort Incentives in Online Labor Markets: Punishments and Rewards for Individuals and Groups
Online labor markets and the humans that power them serve a critical role in the advancement of artificial intelligence and supervised machine learning via the creation of useful training datasets. The use of human effort in online labor markets is not enough, however, as a key factor is understanding the possible interventions that market operators can leverage to incentivize human effort among their labor force. We propose that platforms could implement mechanisms such as rewards or punishments at individual or group levels to incentivize real-effort and output. We apply our interventions using a collaborative image tagging experiment—a folksonomy—and the results provide interesting insights and nonobvious consequences. On average, interventions applied at the group level outperformed interventions applied at the individual level. Punishing the group provided the most controversial incentive strategy and provided a nonobvious significant improvement in effort. Rewarding or sanctioning an individual had similar effects on average, with both treatments leading to significant increases in effort post-intervention. In contrast to predictions, sanctioning appears to have significantly motivated those that were punished. Overall, the interventions applied in our real-effort collaborative image tagging experiment had a significant impact on behavior, which provides guidance for online labor market operators and the use of incentives in the creation of labeled machine learning training datasets.
期刊介绍:
Journal Name: MIS Quarterly
Editorial Objective:
The editorial objective of MIS Quarterly is focused on:
Enhancing and communicating knowledge related to:
Development of IT-based services
Management of IT resources
Use, impact, and economics of IT with managerial, organizational, and societal implications
Addressing professional issues affecting the Information Systems (IS) field as a whole
Key Focus Areas:
Development of IT-based services
Management of IT resources
Use, impact, and economics of IT with managerial, organizational, and societal implications
Professional issues affecting the IS field as a whole