远视不稳定性最小

IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-10 DOI:10.1007/s00182-024-00887-2
Pierre de Callataÿ, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
{"title":"远视不稳定性最小","authors":"Pierre de Callataÿ, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch","doi":"10.1007/s00182-024-00887-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose the notion of minimal farsighted instability to determine the states that are more likely to emerge in the long run when agents are farsighted. A state is minimally farsighted unstable if there is no other state which is more farsightedly stable. To formulate what it means to be more farsightedly stable, we compare states by comparing (in the set inclusion or cardinal sense) their sets of farsighted defeating states. We next compare states in terms of their absorbtiveness by comparing both their sets of farsighted defeating states (i.e. in terms of their stability) and their sets of farsighted defeated states (i.e. in terms of their reachability). A state is maximally farsighted absorbing if there is no other state which is more farsightedly absorbing. We provide general results for characterizing minimally farsighted unstable states and maximally farsighted absorbing states, and we study their relationships with alternative notions of farsightedness. Finally, we use experimental data to show the relevance of the new solution concepts.</p>","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Minimal farsighted instability\",\"authors\":\"Pierre de Callataÿ, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s00182-024-00887-2\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We propose the notion of minimal farsighted instability to determine the states that are more likely to emerge in the long run when agents are farsighted. A state is minimally farsighted unstable if there is no other state which is more farsightedly stable. To formulate what it means to be more farsightedly stable, we compare states by comparing (in the set inclusion or cardinal sense) their sets of farsighted defeating states. We next compare states in terms of their absorbtiveness by comparing both their sets of farsighted defeating states (i.e. in terms of their stability) and their sets of farsighted defeated states (i.e. in terms of their reachability). A state is maximally farsighted absorbing if there is no other state which is more farsightedly absorbing. We provide general results for characterizing minimally farsighted unstable states and maximally farsighted absorbing states, and we study their relationships with alternative notions of farsightedness. Finally, we use experimental data to show the relevance of the new solution concepts.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":14155,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Game Theory\",\"volume\":\"52 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Game Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-024-00887-2\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-024-00887-2","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提出了 "最小远视不稳定性 "的概念,以确定代理人远视时更有可能出现的长期状态。如果没有其他更有远见的稳定状态,那么这种状态就是最小有远见的不稳定状态。为了说明更有远见的稳定意味着什么,我们通过比较(在集合包含或心算意义上)各国的有远见的失败状态集合来比较各国。接下来,我们通过比较有远见的战败状态集(即稳定性)和有远见的战败状态集(即可达性)来比较国家的吸收性。如果不存在其他远视吸收能力更强的状态,那么该状态就是最大远视吸收状态。我们提供了描述最小远视不稳定状态和最大远视吸收状态的一般结果,并研究了它们与其他远视概念的关系。最后,我们利用实验数据来证明新的求解概念的相关性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

摘要图片

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Minimal farsighted instability

We propose the notion of minimal farsighted instability to determine the states that are more likely to emerge in the long run when agents are farsighted. A state is minimally farsighted unstable if there is no other state which is more farsightedly stable. To formulate what it means to be more farsightedly stable, we compare states by comparing (in the set inclusion or cardinal sense) their sets of farsighted defeating states. We next compare states in terms of their absorbtiveness by comparing both their sets of farsighted defeating states (i.e. in terms of their stability) and their sets of farsighted defeated states (i.e. in terms of their reachability). A state is maximally farsighted absorbing if there is no other state which is more farsightedly absorbing. We provide general results for characterizing minimally farsighted unstable states and maximally farsighted absorbing states, and we study their relationships with alternative notions of farsightedness. Finally, we use experimental data to show the relevance of the new solution concepts.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
International Journal of Game Theory
International Journal of Game Theory 数学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
9
审稿时长
1 months
期刊介绍: International Journal of Game Theory is devoted to game theory and its applications. It publishes original research making significant contributions from a methodological, conceptual or mathematical point of view. Survey articles may also be considered if especially useful for the field.
期刊最新文献
Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design: comment The Shapley value in positional queueing problems Semidefinite games Vexing vexillological logic Finitely additive behavioral strategies: when do they induce an unambiguous expected payoff?
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1