{"title":"善 \"的循环定义与循环定义之善","authors":"Andrés G. Garcia","doi":"10.1007/s10677-024-10439-y","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>I defend the view that circular definitions can be useful and illuminating by focusing on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This definition states that an item has value if and only if it is a fitting target of attitudes. Good items are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, and bad items are the fitting targets of negative ones. I shall argue that a circular version of this definition, defended by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006), is preferable to its non-circular counterpart and upholds reasonable standards of acceptability. The standards I will be discussing come from Humberstone (1997), who claims that definitions cannot be informative as long as they are <i>inferentially circular</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Circular Definitions of ‘Good’ and the Good of Circular Definitions\",\"authors\":\"Andrés G. Garcia\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10677-024-10439-y\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>I defend the view that circular definitions can be useful and illuminating by focusing on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This definition states that an item has value if and only if it is a fitting target of attitudes. Good items are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, and bad items are the fitting targets of negative ones. I shall argue that a circular version of this definition, defended by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006), is preferable to its non-circular counterpart and upholds reasonable standards of acceptability. The standards I will be discussing come from Humberstone (1997), who claims that definitions cannot be informative as long as they are <i>inferentially circular</i>.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47052,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice\",\"volume\":\"19 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-024-10439-y\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-024-10439-y","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Circular Definitions of ‘Good’ and the Good of Circular Definitions
I defend the view that circular definitions can be useful and illuminating by focusing on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This definition states that an item has value if and only if it is a fitting target of attitudes. Good items are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, and bad items are the fitting targets of negative ones. I shall argue that a circular version of this definition, defended by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006), is preferable to its non-circular counterpart and upholds reasonable standards of acceptability. The standards I will be discussing come from Humberstone (1997), who claims that definitions cannot be informative as long as they are inferentially circular.
期刊介绍:
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice is a double-anonymous peer-reviewed philosophical journal which aims to publish the best work produced in all fields of practical philosophy. It welcomes high-quality, rigorous and original, submissions regardless of the traditions or schools of thought from which they derive. As an editorial priority, however, published papers should be accessible to the philosophical community at large and as free as possible of unnecessary jargon.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice publishes work on ethical theories that address practical problems, as well as work that presents or examines empirical findings regarding moral practices relevant for ethical theorizing. The journal therefore actively seeks to promote cross-fertilization across areas of practical philosophy—such as moral, political, legal, and social philosophy—and more empirical disciplines, such as medicine, economics, sociology, political science, and psychology. It welcomes work in applied ethics provided that it can offer theoretical or normative contributions to larger philosophical debates. The journal also considers historically-oriented contributions provided they are not mainly exegetical and can offer insights for current debates in practical philosophy.
The journal endorses the BPA/ SWIP-UK Good Practice for Journals. Further details are available in our Review Policy document.