怎样才能使论证有力？

IF 0.9 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Informal Logic Pub Date : 2024-03-15 DOI:10.22329/il.v44i1.8222

Blake D. Scott

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引用次数: 0

摘要

人们普遍认为，佩雷尔曼和奥尔布莱希茨-泰特卡的论证理论容易受到相对主义的指控。本文对佩雷尔曼和奥尔布莱希茨-泰特卡的规范性观点进行了更为宽容的解释，与现有解释相比，本文适当考虑了他们工作的历史轨迹和更广泛的文本。本文认为，他们的观点与其说是一种相对主义，不如说是一种 "关于论据的对立主义"。这种更准确的描述有助于唤起人们对佩雷尔曼和奥尔布莱希茨-泰特卡作品的兴趣，并与当代论证理论的发展趋势建立联系。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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What Makes an Argument Strong?

It is widely believed that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of argumentation is vulnerable to the charge of relativism. This paper provides a more charitable interpretation of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s normative views, one that properly considers the historical trajectory of their work and a wider range of texts than existing interpretations. It is argued that their views are better characterized as a form of “contrastivism about arguments” than any kind relativism. This more accurate depiction contributes to ongoing efforts to revive interest in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work as well as build bridges with trends in contemporary argumentation theory.

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来源期刊

Informal Logic PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

12 weeks

期刊介绍： Informal Logic publishes articles that advance the dialectic in reasoning and argumentation theory and practice. Primary criteria for the acceptance of articles with a theoretical focus or interest are: (1) the article advances the dialectic or constitutes an interesting comment on it: it presents a cogent argument, objection, interpretation or position that is an advance in relation to the background of issues and controversies on the topic; or it casts the issue addressed in a new and worthwhile light; and (2) the article makes explicit reference to the pertinent literature on its topic, and it discharges the burden of proof imposed by that scholarship. Primary criteria for acceptance of articles devoted to the teaching of informal logic, critical thinking or argumentation include: originality; utility; timeliness; and evidence of the effectiveness of the methods, materials, technologies, etc., proposed. The standard criteria for scholarly publication—topical fit with the subjects covered in the journal; adequacy of coverage to the issue addressed; clarity, organization and literateness of the prose; conceptual clarity and cogency of argumentation—apply ceteris paribus to the selection of all articles, notes and reviews.

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