{"title":"创始人领导的公司承担的风险更高吗？","authors":"Edward Lawrence, Yuka Nishikawa, Arun Upadhyay","doi":"10.1111/fire.12388","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines whether firms led by founder-CEOs are significantly different from firms led by nonfounder-CEOs in terms of the nature of their risk. Our results show that founder-led firms are associated with higher operational but lower financial risk. We find that the differential nature of risk-taking in founder-CEO firms is driven by CEO's influence, their propensity of removal, and the probability of bankruptcy of the firm. While CEO-chair duality and the sensitivity of founder-CEO firm's probable bankruptcy play significant roles in determining the level of financial risk, the sensitivity of founder-CEOs to forced turnover leads to higher operational risk.</p>","PeriodicalId":47617,"journal":{"name":"FINANCIAL REVIEW","volume":"59 3","pages":"687-717"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do firms led by founders take higher risk?\",\"authors\":\"Edward Lawrence, Yuka Nishikawa, Arun Upadhyay\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/fire.12388\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>This study examines whether firms led by founder-CEOs are significantly different from firms led by nonfounder-CEOs in terms of the nature of their risk. Our results show that founder-led firms are associated with higher operational but lower financial risk. We find that the differential nature of risk-taking in founder-CEO firms is driven by CEO's influence, their propensity of removal, and the probability of bankruptcy of the firm. While CEO-chair duality and the sensitivity of founder-CEO firm's probable bankruptcy play significant roles in determining the level of financial risk, the sensitivity of founder-CEOs to forced turnover leads to higher operational risk.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47617,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"FINANCIAL REVIEW\",\"volume\":\"59 3\",\"pages\":\"687-717\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"FINANCIAL REVIEW\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fire.12388\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"FINANCIAL REVIEW","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fire.12388","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
本研究探讨了创始人-CEO 领导的公司与非创始人-CEO 领导的公司在风险性质方面是否存在显著差异。我们的研究结果表明，创始人领导的公司运营风险较高，但财务风险较低。我们发现，创始人-CEO 企业承担风险的不同性质是由 CEO 的影响力、其被撤职的倾向以及企业破产的概率驱动的。首席执行官与董事长的双重身份和创始人-首席执行官公司可能破产的敏感性在决定财务风险水平方面发挥了重要作用，而创始人-首席执行官对被迫更替的敏感性则导致了更高的运营风险。
This study examines whether firms led by founder-CEOs are significantly different from firms led by nonfounder-CEOs in terms of the nature of their risk. Our results show that founder-led firms are associated with higher operational but lower financial risk. We find that the differential nature of risk-taking in founder-CEO firms is driven by CEO's influence, their propensity of removal, and the probability of bankruptcy of the firm. While CEO-chair duality and the sensitivity of founder-CEO firm's probable bankruptcy play significant roles in determining the level of financial risk, the sensitivity of founder-CEOs to forced turnover leads to higher operational risk.
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