保护隐私的联盟学习博弈论框架

IF 7.2 4区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology Pub Date : 2024-04-10 DOI:10.1145/3656049
Xiaojin Zhang, Lixin Fan, Siwei Wang, Wenjie Li, Kai Chen, Qiang Yang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在联合学习中,良性参与者的目标是共同优化全局模型。然而,在半诚信对手存在的情况下,隐私泄露的风险不容忽视。现有的研究要么侧重于设计保护机制,要么侧重于发明攻击机制。虽然防御者和攻击者之间的斗争似乎永无止境,但我们关注的是一个关键问题:是否有可能提前预防潜在的攻击?为了解决这个问题,我们提出了第一个博弈论框架,该框架从 FL 捍卫者和攻击者各自的回报(包括计算成本、FL 模型效用和隐私泄露风险)的角度来考虑他们。我们将这种博弈命名为联合学习隐私博弈(FLPG),在这种博弈中,防御者和攻击者都不知道所有参与者的回报。为了处理这种情况下固有的不完整信息,我们建议将 FLPG 与一个甲骨文联系起来,甲骨文有两个主要职责。首先,神谕为参与者提供报酬的下限和上限。其次,神谕作为一个相关设备,私下向每个玩家提供建议行动。利用这个新颖的框架,我们分析了防御方和攻击方的最优策略。此外,我们还推导并证明了攻击方作为理性决策者应始终遵循甲骨文建议不攻击的条件。
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A Game-theoretic Framework for Privacy-preserving Federated Learning

In federated learning, benign participants aim to optimize a global model collaboratively. However, the risk of privacy leakage cannot be ignored in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Existing research has focused either on designing protection mechanisms or on inventing attacking mechanisms. While the battle between defenders and attackers seems never-ending, we are concerned with one critical question: is it possible to prevent potential attacks in advance? To address this, we propose the first game-theoretic framework that considers both FL defenders and attackers in terms of their respective payoffs, which include computational costs, FL model utilities, and privacy leakage risks. We name this game the federated learning privacy game (FLPG), in which neither defenders nor attackers are aware of all participants’ payoffs. To handle the incomplete information inherent in this situation, we propose associating the FLPG with an oracle that has two primary responsibilities. First, the oracle provides lower and upper bounds of the payoffs for the players. Second, the oracle acts as a correlation device, privately providing suggested actions to each player. With this novel framework, we analyze the optimal strategies of defenders and attackers. Furthermore, we derive and demonstrate conditions under which the attacker, as a rational decision-maker, should always follow the oracle’s suggestion not to attack.

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来源期刊
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE-COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
CiteScore
9.30
自引率
2.00%
发文量
131
期刊介绍: ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology is a scholarly journal that publishes the highest quality papers on intelligent systems, applicable algorithms and technology with a multi-disciplinary perspective. An intelligent system is one that uses artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to offer important services (e.g., as a component of a larger system) to allow integrated systems to perceive, reason, learn, and act intelligently in the real world. ACM TIST is published quarterly (six issues a year). Each issue has 8-11 regular papers, with around 20 published journal pages or 10,000 words per paper. Additional references, proofs, graphs or detailed experiment results can be submitted as a separate appendix, while excessively lengthy papers will be rejected automatically. Authors can include online-only appendices for additional content of their published papers and are encouraged to share their code and/or data with other readers.
期刊最新文献
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