互补还是替代?合同设计、合同执行和信任对提高项目绩效的启示

IF 7.4 1区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT International Journal of Project Management Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI:10.1016/j.ijproman.2024.102587
Lihan Zhang , Yongcheng Fu , Jingyi Lai , Yongqiang Chen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

合同治理和关系治理的相互作用对项目绩效的影响尚无定论,由此引发了互补与替代的争论。本研究从配置的角度出发,通过将合同治理概念化为设计(控制、协调和适应功能)和执行,以及将关系治理概念化为信任,对两者的综合效应进行了研究,从而为这一争论增添了微妙的变化。通过对从中国承包商承接的国际建筑项目中收集的调查数据进行定性比较分析,发现了项目绩效高低的多种途径。合同协调和信任是最关键的因素,无论其他条件如何,这两个因素的协同应用都证明是有益的。虽然仅靠合同管理就能确保高绩效,但信任必须与基于合同的机制协同运作。没有充分信任的严格合约执行会导致绩效低下。通过将交易成本理论和社会交换理论联系起来,本研究加深了对项目治理机制之间相互关系的理解,并提高了项目绩效。
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Complements or substitutes? Recipes of contract design, contract enforcement, and trust for enhanced project performance

The interplay of contractual and relational governance has shown inconclusive effects on project performance, resulting in the complements versus substitutes debate. Adding nuance to this debate, this study takes a configurational perspective and examines their combined effects by conceptualizing contractual governance as design (control, coordination, and adaptation functions) and enforcement, and relational governance as trust. A qualitative comparative analysis of survey data collected from international construction projects undertaken by Chinese contractors reveals multiple pathways for high or low project performance. Contractual coordination and trust are the most critical factors, with their synergistic application proving beneficial regardless of other conditions. Although contractual governance alone can ensure high performance, trust must operate in tandem with contract-based mechanisms. Strict contract enforcement without sufficient trust results in poor performance. By connecting the transaction cost theory and social exchange theory, this study deepens the understanding of interrelations between project governance mechanisms and enhances project performance.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
12.30
自引率
26.20%
发文量
83
审稿时长
59 days
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Project Management is recognized as a premier publication in the field of project management and organization studies. Our main objective is to contribute to the advancement of project management and project organizing through the publication of groundbreaking research. We are dedicated to presenting fresh insights and new knowledge in various domains, including project management, program management, portfolio management, project-oriented organizations, project networks, and project-oriented societies. We actively encourage submissions that explore project management and organizing from the perspectives of organizational behavior, strategy, supply chain management, technology, change management, innovation, and sustainability. By publishing high-quality research articles and reviews, we strive to revolutionize the academic landscape and propel the field of project management forward. We invite researchers, scholars, and practitioners to contribute to our journal and be a part of the progressive development in this exciting field.
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