{"title":"财政转移支付的政治经济学:埃塞俄比亚案例","authors":"Bizuneh Getachew Yimenu","doi":"10.1002/pad.2053","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the political economy of fiscal transfers in Ethiopia. Utilising an original data set spanning 1995–2020, as well as interviews and document analyses, the article illustrates how different factors interact to shape the distribution of grants. Statistical analysis indicates that population size is critical in determining regional grant shares. However, the analyses reveal a pattern of ethno‐regional favouritism in grant distributions during the early stages of Ethiopian federalism. During that period, opaque and centralised decision‐making processes, coupled with the dominant influence of the Tigray People's Liberation Front in the federal government, resulted in grant distribution deviating from principles of fiscal equity. Over time, this evolved into more fluid forms of negotiation influenced by intra‐party competition, dynamics of bargaining between the central and regional authorities, and regional assertiveness, collectively shaping the allocation of grants alongside the grant formula. The analysis highlights how economically and politically marginalised regions are disadvantaged, especially when their population is small. The absence of an independent grant agency means that political considerations continue to affect seemingly formula‐driven allocations. The Ethiopian case underscores how intra‐party bargaining and alignment along ethnic and regional lines undermine the effectiveness of formula‐based grant allocations in the absence of an independent and empowered grant agency.","PeriodicalId":39679,"journal":{"name":"Public Administration and Development","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The political economy of fiscal transfers: The case of Ethiopia\",\"authors\":\"Bizuneh Getachew Yimenu\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/pad.2053\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article examines the political economy of fiscal transfers in Ethiopia. Utilising an original data set spanning 1995–2020, as well as interviews and document analyses, the article illustrates how different factors interact to shape the distribution of grants. Statistical analysis indicates that population size is critical in determining regional grant shares. However, the analyses reveal a pattern of ethno‐regional favouritism in grant distributions during the early stages of Ethiopian federalism. During that period, opaque and centralised decision‐making processes, coupled with the dominant influence of the Tigray People's Liberation Front in the federal government, resulted in grant distribution deviating from principles of fiscal equity. Over time, this evolved into more fluid forms of negotiation influenced by intra‐party competition, dynamics of bargaining between the central and regional authorities, and regional assertiveness, collectively shaping the allocation of grants alongside the grant formula. The analysis highlights how economically and politically marginalised regions are disadvantaged, especially when their population is small. The absence of an independent grant agency means that political considerations continue to affect seemingly formula‐driven allocations. The Ethiopian case underscores how intra‐party bargaining and alignment along ethnic and regional lines undermine the effectiveness of formula‐based grant allocations in the absence of an independent and empowered grant agency.\",\"PeriodicalId\":39679,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Public Administration and Development\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Public Administration and Development\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.2053\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"DEVELOPMENT STUDIES\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Public Administration and Development","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.2053","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"DEVELOPMENT STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
The political economy of fiscal transfers: The case of Ethiopia
This article examines the political economy of fiscal transfers in Ethiopia. Utilising an original data set spanning 1995–2020, as well as interviews and document analyses, the article illustrates how different factors interact to shape the distribution of grants. Statistical analysis indicates that population size is critical in determining regional grant shares. However, the analyses reveal a pattern of ethno‐regional favouritism in grant distributions during the early stages of Ethiopian federalism. During that period, opaque and centralised decision‐making processes, coupled with the dominant influence of the Tigray People's Liberation Front in the federal government, resulted in grant distribution deviating from principles of fiscal equity. Over time, this evolved into more fluid forms of negotiation influenced by intra‐party competition, dynamics of bargaining between the central and regional authorities, and regional assertiveness, collectively shaping the allocation of grants alongside the grant formula. The analysis highlights how economically and politically marginalised regions are disadvantaged, especially when their population is small. The absence of an independent grant agency means that political considerations continue to affect seemingly formula‐driven allocations. The Ethiopian case underscores how intra‐party bargaining and alignment along ethnic and regional lines undermine the effectiveness of formula‐based grant allocations in the absence of an independent and empowered grant agency.
期刊介绍:
Since its founding in 1949, Public Administration and Development (PAD) has been reviewing and assessing the practice of public administration at the local, regional, national and international levels where it is directed to managing development processes in low and medium income countries. It gives special attention to investigations of the management of all phases of public policy formulation and implementation which have an interest and importance beyond a particular government and state. PAD has a particular interest in the link between public administration practice and management research and provides a professional and academic forum for reporting on new experiences and experiments. PAD also publishes articles on development management research in the NGO sector. It is widely read by academics and practitioners alike, including consultants, donors and policy advisers. With its case study approach, it is also frequently used for teaching and training purposes.