独裁政权的选举机构和镇压

IF 2.9 2区社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE Electoral Studies Pub Date : 2024-05-05 DOI:10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102791

Chao-Yo Cheng , Yuree Noh

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们认为，专制选举与镇压之间的关系取决于所采用的选举制度。比例代表制（PR）可以吸纳更多不同的政治团体参与竞选并获得立法机构的席位，因此独裁者不太可能使用基础广泛的镇压手段。相比之下，在多元化规则下，政权有更多的动机来动员投票率并阻止集体行动。通过研究 1990 年至 2010 年的选举制度，我们发现只有在非民主国家较少使用的公投制度下，选举才会减少基础广泛的镇压。我们的结果凸显了正式制度在塑造政治结果方面的重要性，即使在独裁国家也是如此。

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Electoral institutions and repression in dictatorships

We argue that the relationship between authoritarian elections and repression depends on the electoral system in use. Proportional representation (PR) systems co-opt more heterogeneous political groups to contest and receive seats in the legislature and thus, dictators are less likely to use broad-based repression. Under plurality rules, by contrast, the regime has more incentives to mobilize turnout and deter collective action. Examining electoral systems from 1990 to 2010, we find that elections only reduce broad-based repression under PR systems, which are less commonly used in non-democracies. Our results highlight the importance of formal institutions in shaping political outcomes even in dictatorships.

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来源期刊

Electoral Studies POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

3.40

自引率

13.00%

发文量

审稿时长

67 days

期刊介绍： Electoral Studies is an international journal covering all aspects of voting, the central act in the democratic process. Political scientists, economists, sociologists, game theorists, geographers, contemporary historians and lawyers have common, and overlapping, interests in what causes voters to act as they do, and the consequences. Electoral Studies provides a forum for these diverse approaches. It publishes fully refereed papers, both theoretical and empirical, on such topics as relationships between votes and seats, and between election outcomes and politicians reactions; historical, sociological, or geographical correlates of voting behaviour; rational choice analysis of political acts, and critiques of such analyses.