作为多期最短路径问题的稳定源连接和分配问题

IF 0.6 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-06 DOI:10.1007/s00182-024-00896-1
Leanne Streekstra, Christian Trudeau
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们假设代理人在多个时段都有需求,从而扩展了我们熟悉的最短路径问题。如果代理人的需求是互补的,这就有可能允许代理人合并他们的路径;例如,如果一个代理人只需要在夏季连接到源头,而另一个代理人只需要在冬季连接到源头。我们不仅证明了由此产生的成本分摊问题总能生成一个完全平衡的博弈,而不管代理人和时段的数量、成本结构或需求状况如何,而且证明了所有完全平衡的博弈都可以表示为多时段最短路径问题。然后,我们利用该模型包含许多已被充分研究的问题这一事实,获得或重新获得了源连接问题、分配问题和最小着色问题的平衡性和完全平衡性结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Stable source connection and assignment problems as multi-period shortest path problems

We extend the familiar shortest path problem by supposing that agents have demands over multiple periods. This potentially allows agents to combine their paths if their demands are complementary; for instance if one agent only needs a connection to the source in the summer while the other requires it only in the winter. We not only show that the resulting cost sharing problem always generates a totally balanced game, regardless of the number of agents and periods, the cost structure or the demand profile, but that all totally balanced games are representable as multi-period shortest path problems. We then exploit the fact that the model encompasses many well-studied problems to obtain or reobtain balancedness and total balancedness results for source-connection problems, assignment problems and minimum coloring problems.

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来源期刊
International Journal of Game Theory
International Journal of Game Theory 数学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
9
审稿时长
1 months
期刊介绍: International Journal of Game Theory is devoted to game theory and its applications. It publishes original research making significant contributions from a methodological, conceptual or mathematical point of view. Survey articles may also be considered if especially useful for the field.
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