Terence J. V. Saldanha, Mariana G. Andrade-Rojas, Abhishek Kathuria, Jiban Khuntia, M.S. Krishnan
{"title":"不确定性如何影响首席执行官长期薪酬对信息技术资本投资的影响","authors":"Terence J. V. Saldanha, Mariana G. Andrade-Rojas, Abhishek Kathuria, Jiban Khuntia, M.S. Krishnan","doi":"10.25300/misq/2023/17433","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<style>#html-body [data-pb-style=ASC28Q8]{justify-content:flex-start;display:flex;flex-direction:column;background-position:left top;background-size:cover;background-repeat:no-repeat;background-attachment:scroll}</style>Firms must allocate resources effectively to cope with uncertainty, which can manifest as a disruption and an opportunity. Although information technology (IT) is a means to cope with uncertainty, chief executive officers (CEOs) may not always support IT investments due to the risky nature of IT, especially when facing uncertain conditions. While prior research suggests that CEO long-term compensation positively incentivizes IT investments, little is known about how different loci of uncertainty impact this relationship. To address this research gap, we study how firm-specific uncertainty and competitive uncertainty shape the influence of CEO long-term compensation on a firm’s IT capital investment. Drawing on agency theory and prospect theory, we develop two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that firm-specific uncertainty and competitive uncertainty positively moderate the influence of CEO long-term compensation on firm IT capital investment. Second, we hypothesize that competitive uncertainty has a stronger positive moderating effect than firm-specific uncertainty on the influence of CEO long-term compensation on firm IT capital investment. Our analysis of secondary longitudinal data from 2000 to 2007 of 357 public firms in the United States supports our hypotheses. In exploratory analyses, we found that CEO long-term compensation results in a higher risk-oriented dominant logic in the firm, particularly in conditions of firm-specific uncertainty and competitive uncertainty, with competitive uncertainty having a stronger positive moderating effect. These findings uncover risk-oriented dominant logic as a theoretical mechanism that explains how CEO long-term compensation positively influences firm IT capital investment in uncertain conditions. We also conducted exploratory analyses using a different secondary dataset of 286 U.S. public firms from 2004 to 2019 to consider firm investments in transformative IT applications and found support for our theory. This finding triangulates our results across different time periods and different types of IT investments. This study contributes to theory and practice by providing a nuanced understanding of boundary conditions surrounding CEO long-term compensation, and decisions CEOs make vis-à-vis IT capital investments.","PeriodicalId":49807,"journal":{"name":"Mis Quarterly","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How the Locus of Uncertainty Shapes the Influence of CEO Long-term Compensation on Information Technology Capital Investments\",\"authors\":\"Terence J. V. Saldanha, Mariana G. Andrade-Rojas, Abhishek Kathuria, Jiban Khuntia, M.S. 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To address this research gap, we study how firm-specific uncertainty and competitive uncertainty shape the influence of CEO long-term compensation on a firm’s IT capital investment. Drawing on agency theory and prospect theory, we develop two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that firm-specific uncertainty and competitive uncertainty positively moderate the influence of CEO long-term compensation on firm IT capital investment. Second, we hypothesize that competitive uncertainty has a stronger positive moderating effect than firm-specific uncertainty on the influence of CEO long-term compensation on firm IT capital investment. Our analysis of secondary longitudinal data from 2000 to 2007 of 357 public firms in the United States supports our hypotheses. In exploratory analyses, we found that CEO long-term compensation results in a higher risk-oriented dominant logic in the firm, particularly in conditions of firm-specific uncertainty and competitive uncertainty, with competitive uncertainty having a stronger positive moderating effect. These findings uncover risk-oriented dominant logic as a theoretical mechanism that explains how CEO long-term compensation positively influences firm IT capital investment in uncertain conditions. We also conducted exploratory analyses using a different secondary dataset of 286 U.S. public firms from 2004 to 2019 to consider firm investments in transformative IT applications and found support for our theory. This finding triangulates our results across different time periods and different types of IT investments. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
#html-body [data-pb-style=ASC28Q8]{justify-content:flex-start;display:flex;flex-direction:column;background-position:left top;background-size:cover;background-repeat:no-repeat;background-attachment:scroll} 企业必须有效地分配资源,以应对不确定性,不确定性可能表现为干扰,也可能表现为机遇。虽然信息技术(IT)是应对不确定性的一种手段,但首席执行官(CEO)可能并不总是支持信息技术投资,因为信息技术具有风险性,尤其是在面临不确定的条件时。此前的研究表明,首席执行官的长期薪酬对信息技术投资具有积极的激励作用,但人们对不同的不确定性如何影响这种关系知之甚少。为了弥补这一研究空白,我们研究了企业特有的不确定性和竞争不确定性如何影响首席执行官长期薪酬对企业 IT 资本投资的影响。借鉴代理理论和前景理论,我们提出了两个假设。首先,我们假设公司特有的不确定性和竞争的不确定性会积极调节首席执行官长期薪酬对公司 IT 资本投资的影响。其次,我们假设竞争不确定性比公司特定不确定性对首席执行官长期薪酬对公司 IT 资本投资的影响具有更强的正向调节作用。我们对美国 357 家上市公司 2000 年至 2007 年的二级纵向数据进行了分析,结果支持了我们的假设。在探索性分析中,我们发现首席执行官长期薪酬会导致企业中更高的风险导向主导逻辑,尤其是在企业特定不确定性和竞争不确定性条件下,竞争不确定性具有更强的正向调节作用。这些发现揭示了以风险为导向的主导逻辑,它是解释首席执行官长期薪酬如何在不确定条件下积极影响企业 IT 资本投资的理论机制。我们还利用 2004 年至 2019 年期间 286 家美国上市公司的不同二级数据集进行了探索性分析,以考虑公司在变革性 IT 应用方面的投资,结果发现我们的理论得到了支持。这一发现在不同时期和不同类型的信息技术投资中对我们的结果进行了三角测量。本研究对 CEO 长期薪酬的边界条件以及 CEO 针对 IT 资本投资所做的决策提供了细致入微的理解,从而为理论和实践做出了贡献。
How the Locus of Uncertainty Shapes the Influence of CEO Long-term Compensation on Information Technology Capital Investments
Firms must allocate resources effectively to cope with uncertainty, which can manifest as a disruption and an opportunity. Although information technology (IT) is a means to cope with uncertainty, chief executive officers (CEOs) may not always support IT investments due to the risky nature of IT, especially when facing uncertain conditions. While prior research suggests that CEO long-term compensation positively incentivizes IT investments, little is known about how different loci of uncertainty impact this relationship. To address this research gap, we study how firm-specific uncertainty and competitive uncertainty shape the influence of CEO long-term compensation on a firm’s IT capital investment. Drawing on agency theory and prospect theory, we develop two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that firm-specific uncertainty and competitive uncertainty positively moderate the influence of CEO long-term compensation on firm IT capital investment. Second, we hypothesize that competitive uncertainty has a stronger positive moderating effect than firm-specific uncertainty on the influence of CEO long-term compensation on firm IT capital investment. Our analysis of secondary longitudinal data from 2000 to 2007 of 357 public firms in the United States supports our hypotheses. In exploratory analyses, we found that CEO long-term compensation results in a higher risk-oriented dominant logic in the firm, particularly in conditions of firm-specific uncertainty and competitive uncertainty, with competitive uncertainty having a stronger positive moderating effect. These findings uncover risk-oriented dominant logic as a theoretical mechanism that explains how CEO long-term compensation positively influences firm IT capital investment in uncertain conditions. We also conducted exploratory analyses using a different secondary dataset of 286 U.S. public firms from 2004 to 2019 to consider firm investments in transformative IT applications and found support for our theory. This finding triangulates our results across different time periods and different types of IT investments. This study contributes to theory and practice by providing a nuanced understanding of boundary conditions surrounding CEO long-term compensation, and decisions CEOs make vis-à-vis IT capital investments.
期刊介绍:
Journal Name: MIS Quarterly
Editorial Objective:
The editorial objective of MIS Quarterly is focused on:
Enhancing and communicating knowledge related to:
Development of IT-based services
Management of IT resources
Use, impact, and economics of IT with managerial, organizational, and societal implications
Addressing professional issues affecting the Information Systems (IS) field as a whole
Key Focus Areas:
Development of IT-based services
Management of IT resources
Use, impact, and economics of IT with managerial, organizational, and societal implications
Professional issues affecting the IS field as a whole