高管-员工薪酬差距与教授董事:来自中国的证据

IF 4.8 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pacific-Basin Finance Journal Pub Date : 2024-06-08 DOI:10.1016/j.pacfin.2024.102425
Xiaofei Song , Hong Fan , Lei Zhou , Ziyao San
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了中国上市公司中教授-董事对高管-员工薪酬差距的影响。大学教授因保持较高的道德标准而享有盛誉,因此社会期望教授-董事倡导社会责任。如果做不到这一点,教授会付出声誉代价。与这一观点一致,我们发现高管与员工的薪酬差距与董事会中是否有教授存在负相关。其他证据表明,教授-董事对高管-员工薪酬差距的负面影响是员工薪酬提高而高管薪酬降低的结果。在独立董事更为有效的强治理环境下,即在中国启动反腐运动之后,在独立董事比例较高的企业中,以及在更为成熟的企业中,我们的研究结果更为显著。此外,教授董事的影响力主要体现在某些声誉成本较高的亚群体中,如那些与受人尊敬的机构相关的董事或年轻的个人,以及那些对锦标赛理论倾向较低的亚群体中,如那些专门从事科学研究或没有海外教育和经验的人。我们的研究结果经受住了许多稳健性检验,包括采用工具方法来解决内生性问题。
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Executive-employee pay gap and professor directors: Evidence from China

This study investigates the impact of professor-directors on the executive-employee pay gap in public Chinese firms. University professors have a reputation for maintaining higher ethical standards, so there is a societal expectation that professor-directors will advocate for social responsibility. Failure to do so will incur reputational costs for professor-directors. Consistent with this view, we find that the executive-employee pay gap is negatively associated with the presence of professors on the board. Additional evidence suggests that the negative impact of professor-directors on the executive-employee pay gap is the result of higher employee salaries and lower executive compensation. Our findings are more pronounced in a strong governance setting where independent directors are more effective, namely after the launch of the anti-corruption campaign in China, in firms with a greater proportion of independent board members, and in more mature firms. Moreover, the influence of professor-directors is primarily seen in certain subgroups that have high reputation costs, such as those associated with esteemed institutions or younger individuals, and in subgroups with low inclination toward tournament theory, such as those specializing in science or without overseas education and experience. Our findings withstand numerous robustness tests, including an instrumental approach to address endogeneity concerns.

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来源期刊
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
6.80
自引率
6.50%
发文量
157
期刊介绍: The Pacific-Basin Finance Journal is aimed at providing a specialized forum for the publication of academic research on capital markets of the Asia-Pacific countries. Primary emphasis will be placed on the highest quality empirical and theoretical research in the following areas: • Market Micro-structure; • Investment and Portfolio Management; • Theories of Market Equilibrium; • Valuation of Financial and Real Assets; • Behavior of Asset Prices in Financial Sectors; • Normative Theory of Financial Management; • Capital Markets of Development; • Market Mechanisms.
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