纯粹意识是既定事物的基础:或者,为什么没有背景接收就没有感知

IF 1.6 4区 心理学 0 PHILOSOPHY Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI:10.53765/20512201.31.5.178
Itay Shani
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要:本文的要旨是,当代意识哲学理论对其研究对象的性质持有一种扭曲的观点。它们沉溺于对意识的理解,过分强调意识在把握意向对象方面的作用,而低估了意识作为接受基础的功能。我首先对这一区别进行了更精确的区分,辨析了两种互补的意识模式:分别是指称模式和助词模式。以洛克为主要代表的对助动词模式的漠视,我接下来要说明的是,这种漠视导致了关于意识本质的一幅根本不完整、因而最终也是不连贯的图景。这一点将通过一些当代意识哲学理论得到进一步证明:高阶监控理论和自我表征理论。然后,我接着问:"称谓模式假说 "能否得到当代神经科学重要趋势的支持?虽然与情感神经科学和自发背景活动之间存在着有趣的联系,但我认为,为了充分公正地对待意识的接受面,我们最终必须诉诸于更激进的纯粹意识概念,这一概念主要是在印度教和佛教哲学中发展起来的。
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Pure Consciousness as the Ground of the Given: Or, Why There is No Perception Without Background Reception
Abstract: The thrust of the present paper is that contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness are in the grip of a distorted perspective on the nature of their subject. They are absorbed in an understanding of consciousness which overemphasizes its role in grasping intentional objects, while undervaluing its functioning as the receptive ground to whom things are given and in whom they are disclosed. I first make the distinction more precise, discerning two complementary modes of consciousness: the accusative mode and the dative mode, respectively. Taking Locke as a primary representative of the disregard for the dative mode, I proceed to show that this negligence leads to a fundamentally incomplete, and therefore ultimately incoherent, picture regarding the nature of consciousness. This is further demonstrated with regard to some contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness: higher-order monitoring theories and self-representational theories. I then move on to enquire, can the dative mode hypothesis receive support from significant trends in contemporary neuroscience? While interesting connections are drawn in relation to affective neuroscience and to spontaneous background activity, I argue that in order to do full justice to the receptive side of consciousness we must ultimately resort to the more radical concept of pure consciousness, developed primarily within Hindu and Buddhist philosophy.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
14.30%
发文量
58
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