{"title":"匈牙利混乱的宪政--承认民粹主义宪法法院的新评估标准","authors":"Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz","doi":"10.1007/s40803-024-00239-y","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The starting point of the paper is that the early constitutional changes after the populist transformation of Hungarian majority state politics (from 2010) and the application of the new Fundamental Law (since 2012) have created difficulty in achieving constitutional justice by judicial means. The fundamental populist constitutional transformation and, within this, the transformation of the regulation of the Constitutional Court have created great challenges for constitutional adjudication. Scholarship on the transformation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court regards the change of jurisprudence as a consequence of the constitutional environment, which ended up in institutional state capture. Basing my arguments on the classic competence-related issues of constitutional justice, activism and deference, I argue here that for constitutional courts, there is always a limited room for manoeuvre by interpretation except for in a ‘hard’ dictatorship. Populist Hungarian jurisprudence is, therefore, not only a consequence of constitutional change but a contribution per se—a cause of the construction of a populist constitution. This job has been done by constitutional interpretation in an activist or deferent manner with regard to specific politically sensitive issues. EU- and emergency-related constitutional conflicts are used here as examples to explain the proposed assessment criteria. The conclusion is that either the Court is activist or deferent, it contributes actively to the populist construction by constitutional interpretation.</p>","PeriodicalId":45733,"journal":{"name":"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Confused Constitutionalism in Hungary—New Assessment Criteria for Recognising a Populist Constitutional Court\",\"authors\":\"Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s40803-024-00239-y\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The starting point of the paper is that the early constitutional changes after the populist transformation of Hungarian majority state politics (from 2010) and the application of the new Fundamental Law (since 2012) have created difficulty in achieving constitutional justice by judicial means. The fundamental populist constitutional transformation and, within this, the transformation of the regulation of the Constitutional Court have created great challenges for constitutional adjudication. Scholarship on the transformation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court regards the change of jurisprudence as a consequence of the constitutional environment, which ended up in institutional state capture. Basing my arguments on the classic competence-related issues of constitutional justice, activism and deference, I argue here that for constitutional courts, there is always a limited room for manoeuvre by interpretation except for in a ‘hard’ dictatorship. Populist Hungarian jurisprudence is, therefore, not only a consequence of constitutional change but a contribution per se—a cause of the construction of a populist constitution. This job has been done by constitutional interpretation in an activist or deferent manner with regard to specific politically sensitive issues. EU- and emergency-related constitutional conflicts are used here as examples to explain the proposed assessment criteria. The conclusion is that either the Court is activist or deferent, it contributes actively to the populist construction by constitutional interpretation.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":45733,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law\",\"volume\":\"6 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00239-y\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00239-y","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Confused Constitutionalism in Hungary—New Assessment Criteria for Recognising a Populist Constitutional Court
The starting point of the paper is that the early constitutional changes after the populist transformation of Hungarian majority state politics (from 2010) and the application of the new Fundamental Law (since 2012) have created difficulty in achieving constitutional justice by judicial means. The fundamental populist constitutional transformation and, within this, the transformation of the regulation of the Constitutional Court have created great challenges for constitutional adjudication. Scholarship on the transformation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court regards the change of jurisprudence as a consequence of the constitutional environment, which ended up in institutional state capture. Basing my arguments on the classic competence-related issues of constitutional justice, activism and deference, I argue here that for constitutional courts, there is always a limited room for manoeuvre by interpretation except for in a ‘hard’ dictatorship. Populist Hungarian jurisprudence is, therefore, not only a consequence of constitutional change but a contribution per se—a cause of the construction of a populist constitution. This job has been done by constitutional interpretation in an activist or deferent manner with regard to specific politically sensitive issues. EU- and emergency-related constitutional conflicts are used here as examples to explain the proposed assessment criteria. The conclusion is that either the Court is activist or deferent, it contributes actively to the populist construction by constitutional interpretation.
期刊介绍:
The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (HJRL) is a multidisciplinary journal that aims to deepen and broaden our knowledge and understanding about the rule of law. Its main areas of interest are: current developments in rule of law in domestic, transnational and international contextstheoretical issues related to the conceptualization and implementation of the rule of law in domestic and international contexts;the relation between the rule of law and economic development, democratization and human rights protection;historical analysis of rule of law;significant trends and initiatives in rule of law promotion (practitioner notes).The HJRL is supported by HiiL Innovating Justice, The Hague, the Netherlands and the Paul Scholten Center for Jurisprudence at the Law School of the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.Editorial PolicyThe HJRL welcomes contributions from academics and practitioners with expertise in any relevant field, including law, anthropology, economics, history, philosophy, political science and sociology. It publishes two categories of articles: papers (appr. 6,000-10,000 words) and notes (appr. 2500 words). Papers are accepted on the basis of double blind peer-review. Notes are accepted on the basis of review by two or more editors of the journal. Manuscripts submitted to the HJRL must not be under consideration for publication elsewhere. Acceptance of the Editorial Board’s offer to publish, implies that the author agrees to an embargo on publication elsewhere for a period of two years following the date of publication in the HJRL.