限制官僚自由裁量权?分析福利部门行政司法审查的设计和行使

Governance Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI:10.1111/gove.12891
Karin Leijon, Linda Moberg
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文为理解行政司法审查的设计如何限制不同官僚行为者的自由裁量权制定了一个框架。该框架认为,如果法院可以(i)以实质性理由推翻官僚机构的决定,(ii)审查与高经济成本相关的决定,以及(iii)就如何执行裁决发布详细指示,那么官僚机构的自由裁量权就会受到很大程度的限制。将该框架应用于瑞典案例,我们首先表明,司法审查程序的立法设计允许行政法院极大地限制高级官员和基层官僚的自由裁量权。其次,我们表明瑞典法院尊重福利部门官僚行为者的专业知识,很少推翻决定。然而,当法院实际推翻决定时,他们经常通过对高成本案件做出详细判决来限制官僚的自由裁量权,这可能会破坏良好治理的条件。
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Limiting bureaucratic discretion? Analyzing the design and exercise of administrative judicial review in the welfare sector
This article develops a framework for understanding how the design of administrative judicial review can circumscribe the discretion of different bureaucratic actors. The framework proposes that bureaucratic discretion is limited to a great extent if courts can (i) overturn bureaucratic decisions on substantive grounds, (ii) review decisions associated with high economic costs, and (iii) issue detailed instructions for how rulings are to be implemented. Applying the framework to the Swedish case, we first show that the legislative design of the judicial review process allows administrative courts to greatly limit the discretion of senior officials and street‐level bureaucrats. Second, we show that Swedish courts defer to the expertise of bureaucratic actors in the welfare sector by sparingly overturning decisions. However, when courts actually overturn decisions, they frequently limit bureaucratic discretion by issuing detailed judgments in high‐cost cases, possibly undermining the conditions for good governance.
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