Isabelle Adam, Elizabeth Dávid‐Barrett, Mihály Fazekas
Transparency reforms make government contracting more open and amenable to public scrutiny, helping to improve public spending efficiency. But they are also politically sensitive, complex and highly technical, which makes them especially difficult to implement if state capacity is weak. Our research on nine low‐ and middle‐income countries in Africa and Asia systematically assesses progress in improving the legal framework for procurement transparency and implementing systems that allow open access to data, between 2008 and 2019. Through interviews with key informants, we explore the reasons for progress or its absence, finding that success relies on strong leadership commitment, broad coalitions of state and non‐state actors, and sufficient technical capacity. Leadership commitment ensures that implementing bodies have the appropriate mandate and resources, while broad coalitions sustain commitment and harness external technical assistance. Both factors are best achieved by framing the reforms as a way of improving efficiency rather than fighting corruption.
{"title":"The political economy of open contracting reforms in low‐ and middle‐income countries","authors":"Isabelle Adam, Elizabeth Dávid‐Barrett, Mihály Fazekas","doi":"10.1111/gove.12897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12897","url":null,"abstract":"Transparency reforms make government contracting more open and amenable to public scrutiny, helping to improve public spending efficiency. But they are also politically sensitive, complex and highly technical, which makes them especially difficult to implement if state capacity is weak. Our research on nine low‐ and middle‐income countries in Africa and Asia systematically assesses progress in improving the legal framework for procurement transparency and implementing systems that allow open access to data, between 2008 and 2019. Through interviews with key informants, we explore the reasons for progress or its absence, finding that success relies on strong leadership commitment, broad coalitions of state and non‐state actors, and sufficient technical capacity. Leadership commitment ensures that implementing bodies have the appropriate mandate and resources, while broad coalitions sustain commitment and harness external technical assistance. Both factors are best achieved by framing the reforms as a way of improving efficiency rather than fighting corruption.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142175158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article investigates the role of citizen political affinities in shaping attitudes towards judicial decisions in corruption cases involving politicians. Although emerging research suggests that decisions regarding a high‐ranking politician can reduce general citizen trust in courts, there is no systematic evidence examining how political affinities differentially affect confidence in court decisions depending on the accused politician. We conducted a survey experiment during a 2022 presidential election rally in Brazil at a time of heightened affective polarization and corruption. We presented respondents with vignettes detailing a fictional corruption scheme and trial outcomes (acquittal or conviction) involving key political figures, including Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Jair Bolsonaro. The results indicate that when a court decision is consistent with citizens' electoral preferences, they are more inclined to trust the court decision and vice versa.
本文研究了公民的政治亲和力在影响人们对涉及政治人物的腐败案件的司法判决的态度方面所起的作用。尽管新的研究表明，有关高级政客的判决会降低一般公民对法院的信任，但目前还没有系统的证据来研究政治亲和力如何根据被指控政客的不同而对法院判决的信心产生不同的影响。我们在 2022 年巴西总统大选集会期间进行了一项调查实验，当时正值情绪两极分化和腐败加剧的时期。我们向受访者展示了虚构的腐败计划和审判结果（无罪释放或定罪），其中涉及包括路易斯-伊纳西奥-卢拉-达席尔瓦（Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva）和雅伊尔-博尔索纳罗（Jair Bolsonaro）在内的主要政治人物。结果表明，当法院判决与公民的选举偏好一致时，他们更倾向于相信法院判决，反之亦然。
{"title":"In court we trust? Political affinity and citizen's attitudes toward court's decisions","authors":"Carlos Pereira, André Klevenhusen, Lúcia Barros","doi":"10.1111/gove.12898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12898","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the role of citizen political affinities in shaping attitudes towards judicial decisions in corruption cases involving politicians. Although emerging research suggests that decisions regarding a high‐ranking politician can reduce general citizen trust in courts, there is no systematic evidence examining how political affinities differentially affect confidence in court decisions depending on the accused politician. We conducted a survey experiment during a 2022 presidential election rally in Brazil at a time of heightened affective polarization and corruption. We presented respondents with vignettes detailing a fictional corruption scheme and trial outcomes (acquittal or conviction) involving key political figures, including Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Jair Bolsonaro. The results indicate that when a court decision is consistent with citizens' electoral preferences, they are more inclined to trust the court decision and vice versa.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142175160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Governments increasingly restrict civil society organizations (CSOs). Different theories converge on the expectation that CSOs are important for public goods. A largely unexplored implication is that increased restrictions on CSOs will signal the under‐delivery of public goods. Using data on government‐imposed restrictions on CSOs for a global sample of countries, we test this implication. Controlling for unobserved cross‐country heterogeneity, temporal shocks, and confounding variables, we find that the accumulation of restrictions on CSOs negatively correlate with public goods‐oriented government spending and positively correlate with corruption and clientelism in the future. Our evidence also suggests that the mechanism underpinning these findings is that persistent restrictions on CSOs negatively correlate with engaged society and, to some extent, protest. While global governance actors warn of the negative consequences of restrictions on CSOs, our analyses provide evidence that restrictions are indeed a red flag for governments' failure to live up to their public goods commitment.
{"title":"A red flag for public goods? The correlates of civil society restrictions","authors":"Hannah Smidt, Neil J. Mitchell, Kristin M. Bakke","doi":"10.1111/gove.12894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12894","url":null,"abstract":"Governments increasingly restrict civil society organizations (CSOs). Different theories converge on the expectation that CSOs are important for public goods. A largely unexplored implication is that increased restrictions on CSOs will signal the under‐delivery of public goods. Using data on government‐imposed restrictions on CSOs for a global sample of countries, we test this implication. Controlling for unobserved cross‐country heterogeneity, temporal shocks, and confounding variables, we find that the accumulation of restrictions on CSOs negatively correlate with public goods‐oriented government spending and positively correlate with corruption and clientelism in the future. Our evidence also suggests that the mechanism underpinning these findings is that persistent restrictions on CSOs negatively correlate with engaged society and, to some extent, protest. While global governance actors warn of the negative consequences of restrictions on CSOs, our analyses provide evidence that restrictions are indeed a red flag for governments' failure to live up to their public goods commitment.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142175161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In European governance, transnational administrative networks have become crucial for addressing complex cross‐border challenges, supplementing formal harmonization efforts with informal collaborative mechanisms. However, little attention has been given to their role in addressing super‐wicked policy problems, where formal structures and political prioritization are lacking despite pressing temporal deadlines and substantial costs for future generations. This study investigates the drivers of administrative coordination in Europe within such contexts, using the case of antimicrobial resistance as a case study. Employing a mixed‐method approach, including Logistic Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure and a qualitative analysis based on originally collected expert survey and interview data, the research uncovers a notable trend: countries with similar levels of institutional quality are four times more likely to establish connections. This selective coordination dynamic is shaped by domestic circumstances, politico‐administrative considerations, and the pursuit of pragmatic, implementable policy solutions, with important implications for the ongoing struggle against antibiotic resistance.
{"title":"Drivers of transnational administrative coordination on super‐wicked policy issues: The role of institutional homophily","authors":"Daniel Carelli","doi":"10.1111/gove.12896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12896","url":null,"abstract":"In European governance, transnational administrative networks have become crucial for addressing complex cross‐border challenges, supplementing formal harmonization efforts with informal collaborative mechanisms. However, little attention has been given to their role in addressing super‐wicked policy problems, where formal structures and political prioritization are lacking despite pressing temporal deadlines and substantial costs for future generations. This study investigates the drivers of administrative coordination in Europe within such contexts, using the case of antimicrobial resistance as a case study. Employing a mixed‐method approach, including Logistic Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure and a qualitative analysis based on originally collected expert survey and interview data, the research uncovers a notable trend: countries with similar levels of institutional quality are four times more likely to establish connections. This selective coordination dynamic is shaped by domestic circumstances, politico‐administrative considerations, and the pursuit of pragmatic, implementable policy solutions, with important implications for the ongoing struggle against antibiotic resistance.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141920605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The question of the legitimacy of government funding of interest groups as a democratic practice has been extensively discussed by scholars. On the one hand, research suggests that well‐resourced interest groups are better equipped to capture European Union (EU) funds, raising some questions regarding the elitist character of the EU system of interest representation. On the other hand, EU funds have been found to address imbalances in the system of interest representation by directing funding streams toward underrepresented citizen groups. The present study contributes to this open discussion, by 1) analyzing to which extent findings from previous studies can be replicated with a more nuanced research design and by employing the largest existing dataset on interest groups and EU funding, and by 2) testing new hypotheses inspired by an alternative theoretical focus to mainstream approaches: associative democracy. To do so, we use data from the Comparative Interest Group Survey, a dataset of almost 2500 organizations across eight EU countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, Slovenia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Poland) and at the EU level. Our results offer two main contributions. By replicating recent studies, our findings nuance conclusions drawn this far regarding existing biases in the EU system of interest representation: it is true that rich and experienced interest groups are more likely to obtain EU funding. However, EU funding is also more likely to be allocated to NGOs, especially when they operate in business‐dominated policy areas. Moreover, we find that EU funds are not as concentrated in EU‐15 member states as previously thought. Finally, inspired by associative democracy, we show that EU funding is more often allocated where good practices are in place. These include membership representation as core function and membership influence over internal decision‐making processes.
学者们广泛讨论了政府资助利益集团作为一种民主实践的合法性问题。一方面，研究表明，资源充足的利益集团更有能力获取欧盟（EU）的资金，这就对欧盟利益代表体系的精英主义特征提出了一些质疑。另一方面，人们发现欧盟基金通过将资金流导向代表性不足的公民群体，解决了利益代表体系中的不平衡问题。本研究为这一公开讨论做出了以下贡献：1）通过更细致的研究设计和使用现有最大的利益集团和欧盟资金数据集，分析在多大程度上可以复制以前的研究结果；2）受主流方法的另一理论焦点--联合民主--的启发，检验新的假设。为此，我们使用了 "利益集团比较调查"（Comparative Interest Group Survey）的数据，该数据集涵盖了八个欧盟国家（比利时、荷兰、瑞典、葡萄牙、斯洛文尼亚、立陶宛、捷克共和国和波兰）和欧盟层面的近 2500 个组织。我们的研究结果有两大贡献。通过重复近期的研究，我们的研究结果对迄今为止得出的有关欧盟利益代表体系中存在的偏见的结论进行了细化：富有和经验丰富的利益集团确实更有可能获得欧盟的资助。然而，欧盟的资金也更有可能分配给非政府组织，尤其是当它们在商业主导的政策领域开展活动时。此外，我们还发现，欧盟资金并不像以前认为的那样集中在欧盟 15 个成员国。最后，受结社民主的启发，我们发现欧盟的资金更倾向于分配给有良好实践的地方。其中包括作为核心职能的成员代表制以及成员对内部决策过程的影响力。
{"title":"European union funding of interest groups: Reassessing the balancing function and the promotion of good organizational practices","authors":"R. Salgado, Marcel Hanegraaff, Michele Crepaz","doi":"10.1111/gove.12895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12895","url":null,"abstract":"The question of the legitimacy of government funding of interest groups as a democratic practice has been extensively discussed by scholars. On the one hand, research suggests that well‐resourced interest groups are better equipped to capture European Union (EU) funds, raising some questions regarding the elitist character of the EU system of interest representation. On the other hand, EU funds have been found to address imbalances in the system of interest representation by directing funding streams toward underrepresented citizen groups. The present study contributes to this open discussion, by 1) analyzing to which extent findings from previous studies can be replicated with a more nuanced research design and by employing the largest existing dataset on interest groups and EU funding, and by 2) testing new hypotheses inspired by an alternative theoretical focus to mainstream approaches: associative democracy. To do so, we use data from the Comparative Interest Group Survey, a dataset of almost 2500 organizations across eight EU countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, Slovenia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Poland) and at the EU level. Our results offer two main contributions. By replicating recent studies, our findings nuance conclusions drawn this far regarding existing biases in the EU system of interest representation: it is true that rich and experienced interest groups are more likely to obtain EU funding. However, EU funding is also more likely to be allocated to NGOs, especially when they operate in business‐dominated policy areas. Moreover, we find that EU funds are not as concentrated in EU‐15 member states as previously thought. Finally, inspired by associative democracy, we show that EU funding is more often allocated where good practices are in place. These include membership representation as core function and membership influence over internal decision‐making processes.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141928193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sebastian Ziaja, Markus Geray, David Sebudubudu, Armin von Schiller
E‐government services are often heralded as a silver bullet for governments willing to engage more meaningfully with citizens. Evidence on the effectiveness of these measures for improving citizen‐state relations is scarce, however. Most studies examining e‐government focus on efficiency considerations; few consider potential effects on citizen‐state relations. The present study analyses the effect of an information treatment about the availability of e‐government services on citizen perceptions of government responsiveness. We conducted an experiment in cooperation with the Botswana Unified Revenue Service that randomly assigned registered taxpayers to receive a short message on their mobile phones. Our results indicate that the treatment has a significant, positive effect on the perception that the government addresses citizen needs, and more so for respondents with lower income. The findings suggest that, by affecting how citizens assess political realities, e‐government can play an important role in shaping citizen‐state relations.
{"title":"E‐government and citizen‐state relations: Evidence from a randomized information campaign with the Botswana Unified Revenue Service","authors":"Sebastian Ziaja, Markus Geray, David Sebudubudu, Armin von Schiller","doi":"10.1111/gove.12893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12893","url":null,"abstract":"E‐government services are often heralded as a silver bullet for governments willing to engage more meaningfully with citizens. Evidence on the effectiveness of these measures for improving citizen‐state relations is scarce, however. Most studies examining e‐government focus on efficiency considerations; few consider potential effects on citizen‐state relations. The present study analyses the effect of an information treatment about the availability of e‐government services on citizen perceptions of government responsiveness. We conducted an experiment in cooperation with the Botswana Unified Revenue Service that randomly assigned registered taxpayers to receive a short message on their mobile phones. Our results indicate that the treatment has a significant, positive effect on the perception that the government addresses citizen needs, and more so for respondents with lower income. The findings suggest that, by affecting how citizens assess political realities, e‐government can play an important role in shaping citizen‐state relations.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141881289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The increasing institutionalization of regulatory oversight worldwide has not resulted in the creation of numerous formal channels of transnational regulatory oversight cooperation. Despite its puzzling nature, this circumstance has barely attracted scholarly attention. Additionally, the study of cooperation across transgovernmental regulatory networks with actors having low autonomy from central governments remains under‐researched. We fill these literature gaps by applying insights from the policy networks literature to identify drivers of transnational regulatory oversight cooperation. Combining Exponential Random Graph Models with semi‐structured interviews, we show that commonalities in administrative traditions drive cooperation. Innovative bodies become sources of best practices. Conversely, exchanges between countries with similar regulatory oversight settings or preferences are rare, perhaps due to their low independence from their political principals. These results suggest that regulatory oversight actors use relational opportunities and general country features as cues for transnational cooperation, instead of adopting strategic partnerships with better matches.
{"title":"Relational dynamics under close supervision: Examining transnational cooperation in regulatory oversight","authors":"Carlos Bravo‐Laguna, David Levi‐Faur","doi":"10.1111/gove.12892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12892","url":null,"abstract":"The increasing institutionalization of regulatory oversight worldwide has not resulted in the creation of numerous formal channels of transnational regulatory oversight cooperation. Despite its puzzling nature, this circumstance has barely attracted scholarly attention. Additionally, the study of cooperation across transgovernmental regulatory networks with actors having low autonomy from central governments remains under‐researched. We fill these literature gaps by applying insights from the policy networks literature to identify drivers of transnational regulatory oversight cooperation. Combining Exponential Random Graph Models with semi‐structured interviews, we show that commonalities in administrative traditions drive cooperation. Innovative bodies become sources of best practices. Conversely, exchanges between countries with similar regulatory oversight settings or preferences are rare, perhaps due to their low independence from their political principals. These results suggest that regulatory oversight actors use relational opportunities and general country features as cues for transnational cooperation, instead of adopting strategic partnerships with better matches.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141779959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do politicians behave opportunistically regarding their tax proposals during the election cycle, or do they maintain ideological sincerity? We examine U.S. governors' revenue proposals between the years of 1989 and 2018 to assess gubernatorial behavior during election years. We find that governors, in general, do indeed follow a political budget cycle where they request lower revenues during election years. However, this finding is largely driven by Democratic governors asking for significantly lower revenues during election years when compared to non‐election years. Republican governors are more ideologically sincere, maintaining behaviors that are consistent across the election cycle.
{"title":"Political tax cycles in the US states: Opportunism versus ideological sincerity in governors' revenue proposals","authors":"James W. Douglas, John Szmer, Ringa Raudla","doi":"10.1111/gove.12886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12886","url":null,"abstract":"Do politicians behave opportunistically regarding their tax proposals during the election cycle, or do they maintain ideological sincerity? We examine U.S. governors' revenue proposals between the years of 1989 and 2018 to assess gubernatorial behavior during election years. We find that governors, in general, do indeed follow a political budget cycle where they request lower revenues during election years. However, this finding is largely driven by Democratic governors asking for significantly lower revenues during election years when compared to non‐election years. Republican governors are more ideologically sincere, maintaining behaviors that are consistent across the election cycle.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141779958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The question of why electoral punishment of corrupt politicians fails to materialize continues to captivate scholars and practitioners. In this research, I draw upon implicit exchange theory to demonstrate that corrupt politicians may retain public trust if they are seen as responsive to the constituency. Analyses of survey data from 590 local business owners in two municipalities in Thailand reveal that political corruption negatively affected public trust, while political responsiveness had a positive effect. Furthermore, as expected, political responsiveness neutralized the trust‐eroding effect of political corruption. Specifically, citizens showed higher levels of trust for politicians perceived as “corrupt but responsive” than for those considered “less corrupt but less responsive.” The results were observed after considering the influence of politician competence and local government performance. These findings paint a rather somber view, suggesting that political corruption in the presence of political responsiveness may create a “façade” of politicians' trustworthiness.
{"title":"Political corruption, political responsiveness and public trust: Testing the implicit exchange hypothesis","authors":"Wisanupong Potipiroon","doi":"10.1111/gove.12888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12888","url":null,"abstract":"The question of why electoral punishment of corrupt politicians fails to materialize continues to captivate scholars and practitioners. In this research, I draw upon implicit exchange theory to demonstrate that corrupt politicians may retain public trust if they are seen as responsive to the constituency. Analyses of survey data from 590 local business owners in two municipalities in Thailand reveal that political corruption negatively affected public trust, while political responsiveness had a positive effect. Furthermore, as expected, political responsiveness neutralized the trust‐eroding effect of political corruption. Specifically, citizens showed higher levels of trust for politicians perceived as “corrupt but responsive” than for those considered “less corrupt but less responsive.” The results were observed after considering the influence of politician competence and local government performance. These findings paint a rather somber view, suggesting that political corruption in the presence of political responsiveness may create a “façade” of politicians' trustworthiness.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141779818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article develops a framework for understanding how the design of administrative judicial review can circumscribe the discretion of different bureaucratic actors. The framework proposes that bureaucratic discretion is limited to a great extent if courts can (i) overturn bureaucratic decisions on substantive grounds, (ii) review decisions associated with high economic costs, and (iii) issue detailed instructions for how rulings are to be implemented. Applying the framework to the Swedish case, we first show that the legislative design of the judicial review process allows administrative courts to greatly limit the discretion of senior officials and street‐level bureaucrats. Second, we show that Swedish courts defer to the expertise of bureaucratic actors in the welfare sector by sparingly overturning decisions. However, when courts actually overturn decisions, they frequently limit bureaucratic discretion by issuing detailed judgments in high‐cost cases, possibly undermining the conditions for good governance.
{"title":"Limiting bureaucratic discretion? Analyzing the design and exercise of administrative judicial review in the welfare sector","authors":"Karin Leijon, Linda Moberg","doi":"10.1111/gove.12891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12891","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops a framework for understanding how the design of administrative judicial review can circumscribe the discretion of different bureaucratic actors. The framework proposes that bureaucratic discretion is limited to a great extent if courts can (i) overturn bureaucratic decisions on substantive grounds, (ii) review decisions associated with high economic costs, and (iii) issue detailed instructions for how rulings are to be implemented. Applying the framework to the Swedish case, we first show that the legislative design of the judicial review process allows administrative courts to greatly limit the discretion of senior officials and street‐level bureaucrats. Second, we show that Swedish courts defer to the expertise of bureaucratic actors in the welfare sector by sparingly overturning decisions. However, when courts actually overturn decisions, they frequently limit bureaucratic discretion by issuing detailed judgments in high‐cost cases, possibly undermining the conditions for good governance.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141779961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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