电召出租车的城市客运和包裹共享运输:上海的模拟定价分析

IF 6.3 2区 工程技术 Q1 ECONOMICS Transport Policy Pub Date : 2024-07-27 DOI:10.1016/j.tranpol.2024.07.020
Yuxiong Ji, Minhang Zhou, Yujing Zheng, Yu Shen, Yuchuan Du
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究提出了一个城市乘客与包裹共享(PPS)系统的框架,该系统除乘客外,还利用电动出租车运送包裹。我们研究了利益相关者之间的互动,并强调了定价策略在该系统中的作用,包括乘客票价折扣和司机对 PPS 行程的奖励。较高的折扣和奖励分别会刺激更多乘客和出租车司机参与 PPS 系统,但可能会限制服务提供商的利润。本文建立了一个多代理模拟模型,以分析定价策略对服务提供商、乘客和出租车司机行为的影响。实际案例研究表明,服务提供商、乘客和出租车司机都能从乘客票价折扣和司机奖励的不同组合中获益。与传统的电召出租车系统相比,定价策略可以产生系统最优(SO)情况,使总收益最大化,也可以产生双赢情况,使所有利益相关者同时受益--服务提供商获得更高的利润,乘客享受更低的出行成本,出租车司机获得更高的收入。建议公共当局提供补贴,以扩大双赢情况的范围,使其涵盖 SO 情况,从而使系统惠及所有利益相关者,并获得最大总收益。
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Urban passenger-and-package sharing transportation by e-hailing taxis: A simulation-based pricing analysis in shanghai

This study proposes a framework of an urban passenger-and-package sharing (PPS) system that utilizes e-hailing taxis to transport packages in addition to passengers. We examine the interactions between stakeholders and highlight the role of the pricing strategy in the system, including passenger fare discounts and driver incentives for PPS trips. Higher discounts and incentives stimulate more passengers and taxi drivers, respectively, to participate in the PPS system but possibly limit the profit of the service provider. A multi-agent simulation model is developed to analyze the influences of the pricing strategy on the behaviors of the service provider, passengers, and taxi drivers. The real-world case study demonstrates that the service provider, passengers, and taxi drivers benefit from different combinations of the passenger fare discounts and driver incentives. The pricing strategy could be set up to produce the system optimal (SO) situation that maximizes the total benefit, or win-win situations that simultaneously benefit all stakeholders—the service provider gains a higher profit, passengers enjoy lower travel costs, and taxi drivers have higher incomes when compared to the traditional e-hailing taxi system. The public authority is suggested to provide a subsidy to expand the domain of win-win situations to cover the SO situation, such that the system benefits all stakeholders and obtains the maximum total benefit.

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来源期刊
Transport Policy
Transport Policy Multiple-
CiteScore
12.10
自引率
10.30%
发文量
282
期刊介绍: Transport Policy is an international journal aimed at bridging the gap between theory and practice in transport. Its subject areas reflect the concerns of policymakers in government, industry, voluntary organisations and the public at large, providing independent, original and rigorous analysis to understand how policy decisions have been taken, monitor their effects, and suggest how they may be improved. The journal treats the transport sector comprehensively, and in the context of other sectors including energy, housing, industry and planning. All modes are covered: land, sea and air; road and rail; public and private; motorised and non-motorised; passenger and freight.
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