随着股东权益的变化，债务对过度投资的缓解作用的实证调查

IF 0.8 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Bulletin of Economic Research Pub Date : 2024-07-31 DOI:10.1111/boer.12471

Chune Young Chung, Daejin Kim, Junyoup Lee

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本研究中，我们探讨了债务治理与过度投资之间的关系。我们使用流向债务持有人的净现金流量作为债务治理的替代指标，并发现这些现金流的增加会缓解企业的过度投资。我们还发现，自由现金流会导致现金充裕和现金不足的公司过度投资，但债务治理会缓解这一问题。最后，我们发现，对债务人的净现金流对过度投资的缓解作用在治理不善的公司中非常明显。这些发现表明，当股东治理薄弱时，向债务人提供净现金流尤其有效。我们的结论是，向债务人提供现金流可以有效防止过度投资，降低自由现金流的代理成本。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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An empirical investigation of the mitigating effect of debt on overinvestment as shareholder rights vary

In this study, we investigate the relationship between debt governance and overinvestment. We use net cash flows to debtholders as a proxy for debt governance and find that an increase in these cash flows mitigates firms' overinvestment. We also show that free cash flows lead cash-rich and cash-poor firms to overinvest but that debt governance attenuates this problem. Finally, we find that the mitigating effect of net cash flows to debtholders on overinvestment is highly pronounced in firms with poor governance. These findings suggest that net cash flows to debtholders are particularly effective when shareholder governance is weak. We conclude that cash flows to debtholders can effectively prevent overinvestment and reduce the agency costs of free cash flows.

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Bulletin of Economic Research ECONOMICS-

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1.40

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0.00%

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期刊介绍： The Bulletin of Economic Research is an international journal publishing articles across the entire field of economics, econometrics and economic history. The Bulletin contains original theoretical, applied and empirical work which makes a substantial contribution to the subject and is of broad interest to economists. We welcome submissions in all fields and, with the Bulletin expanding in new areas, we particularly encourage submissions in the fields of experimental economics, financial econometrics and health economics. In addition to full-length articles the Bulletin publishes refereed shorter articles, notes and comments; authoritative survey articles in all areas of economics and special themed issues.

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