欧盟对利益集团的资助:重新评估平衡职能和促进良好组织做法

Governance Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI:10.1111/gove.12895
R. Salgado, Marcel Hanegraaff, Michele Crepaz
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摘要

学者们广泛讨论了政府资助利益集团作为一种民主实践的合法性问题。一方面,研究表明,资源充足的利益集团更有能力获取欧盟(EU)的资金,这就对欧盟利益代表体系的精英主义特征提出了一些质疑。另一方面,人们发现欧盟基金通过将资金流导向代表性不足的公民群体,解决了利益代表体系中的不平衡问题。本研究为这一公开讨论做出了以下贡献:1)通过更细致的研究设计和使用现有最大的利益集团和欧盟资金数据集,分析在多大程度上可以复制以前的研究结果;2)受主流方法的另一理论焦点--联合民主--的启发,检验新的假设。为此,我们使用了 "利益集团比较调查"(Comparative Interest Group Survey)的数据,该数据集涵盖了八个欧盟国家(比利时、荷兰、瑞典、葡萄牙、斯洛文尼亚、立陶宛、捷克共和国和波兰)和欧盟层面的近 2500 个组织。我们的研究结果有两大贡献。通过重复近期的研究,我们的研究结果对迄今为止得出的有关欧盟利益代表体系中存在的偏见的结论进行了细化:富有和经验丰富的利益集团确实更有可能获得欧盟的资助。然而,欧盟的资金也更有可能分配给非政府组织,尤其是当它们在商业主导的政策领域开展活动时。此外,我们还发现,欧盟资金并不像以前认为的那样集中在欧盟 15 个成员国。最后,受结社民主的启发,我们发现欧盟的资金更倾向于分配给有良好实践的地方。其中包括作为核心职能的成员代表制以及成员对内部决策过程的影响力。
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European union funding of interest groups: Reassessing the balancing function and the promotion of good organizational practices
The question of the legitimacy of government funding of interest groups as a democratic practice has been extensively discussed by scholars. On the one hand, research suggests that well‐resourced interest groups are better equipped to capture European Union (EU) funds, raising some questions regarding the elitist character of the EU system of interest representation. On the other hand, EU funds have been found to address imbalances in the system of interest representation by directing funding streams toward underrepresented citizen groups. The present study contributes to this open discussion, by 1) analyzing to which extent findings from previous studies can be replicated with a more nuanced research design and by employing the largest existing dataset on interest groups and EU funding, and by 2) testing new hypotheses inspired by an alternative theoretical focus to mainstream approaches: associative democracy. To do so, we use data from the Comparative Interest Group Survey, a dataset of almost 2500 organizations across eight EU countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, Slovenia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Poland) and at the EU level. Our results offer two main contributions. By replicating recent studies, our findings nuance conclusions drawn this far regarding existing biases in the EU system of interest representation: it is true that rich and experienced interest groups are more likely to obtain EU funding. However, EU funding is also more likely to be allocated to NGOs, especially when they operate in business‐dominated policy areas. Moreover, we find that EU funds are not as concentrated in EU‐15 member states as previously thought. Finally, inspired by associative democracy, we show that EU funding is more often allocated where good practices are in place. These include membership representation as core function and membership influence over internal decision‐making processes.
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