国资委是否推动了国有企业的创新?

IF 4.8 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pacific-Basin Finance Journal Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI:10.1016/j.pacfin.2024.102484
Guanchun Liu , Qihong Wang , Yunqing Tao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了政府监管对国有企业创新的因果效应。通过利用 2003 年国资委成立对国有企业造成的外生冲击,我们的差分估计结果表明,政府监管有效地促进了国有企业的创新,而且这种积极的创新驱动效应在初始治理质量较低、政策力度较大、创新强度较高的国有企业中更为突出。此外,其深层机理在于这项改革有助于减轻企业的政策负担,提高管理效率。此外,政府监督还能促进国有企业专利质量的提高,从而改善绩效,提高生产率。综上所述,我们的研究结果表明,政府监督对国有企业的创新活动至关重要。
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Does SASAC boost the innovation of state-owned enterprises?

This study examines the causal effect of government monitoring on the innovation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). By exploiting an exogenous shock to SOEs caused by the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003, our difference-in-differences estimates show that government monitoring effectively promotes SOEs' innovation, and this positive innovation-driven effect becomes more prominent in SOEs with lower initial governance quality, stronger policy intensity, and greater innovation intensity. Furthermore, the underlying mechanisms are that this reform helps reduce corporate policy burdens and improve management efficiency. In addition, government monitoring promotes SOEs' patent quality, resulting in enables better performance and higher productivity. Taken together, our findings suggest that government monitoring can be vital to SOEs' innovation activities.

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来源期刊
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
6.80
自引率
6.50%
发文量
157
期刊介绍: The Pacific-Basin Finance Journal is aimed at providing a specialized forum for the publication of academic research on capital markets of the Asia-Pacific countries. Primary emphasis will be placed on the highest quality empirical and theoretical research in the following areas: • Market Micro-structure; • Investment and Portfolio Management; • Theories of Market Equilibrium; • Valuation of Financial and Real Assets; • Behavior of Asset Prices in Financial Sectors; • Normative Theory of Financial Management; • Capital Markets of Development; • Market Mechanisms.
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