{"title":"保证结果稳定的按需移动即服务平台分配游戏","authors":"Bingqing Liu, Joseph Y. J. Chow","doi":"10.1016/j.trb.2024.103060","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) systems are two-sided markets, with two mutually exclusive sets of agents, i.e., travelers/users and operators, forming a mobility ecosystem in which multiple operators compete or cooperate to serve customers under a governing platform provider. This study proposes a MaaS platform equilibrium model based on many-to-many assignment games incorporating both fixed-route transit services and mobility-on-demand (MOD) services. The matching problem is formulated as a convex multicommodity flow network design problem under congestion that captures the cost of accessing MOD services. The local stability conditions reflect a generalization of Wardrop's principles that include operators’ decisions. Due to the presence of congestion, the problem may result in non-stable designs, and a subsidy mechanism from the platform is proposed to guarantee local stability. A new exact solution algorithm to the matching problem is proposed based on a branch and bound framework with a Frank-Wolfe algorithm integrated with Lagrangian relaxation and subgradient optimization, which guarantees the optimality of the matching problem but not stability. A heuristic which integrates stability conditions and subsidy design is proposed, which reaches either an optimal MaaS platform equilibrium solution with global stability, or a feasible locally stable solution that may require subsidy. For the heuristic, a worst-case bound and condition for obtaining an exact solution are both identified. Two sets of reproducible numerical experiments are conducted. The first, on a toy network, verifies the model and algorithm, and illustrates the differences local and global stability. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
移动即服务(MaaS)系统是一个双面市场,由两组相互排斥的代理(即旅行者/用户和运营商)组成一个移动生态系统,在这个生态系统中,多个运营商在一个管理平台提供商的管理下竞争或合作为客户提供服务。本研究提出了一个基于多对多分配博弈的 MaaS 平台均衡模型,其中包含固定路线交通服务和按需移动(MOD)服务。匹配问题被表述为拥堵条件下的凸多商品流网络设计问题,该问题反映了获取 MOD 服务的成本。局部稳定性条件反映了包括运营商决策在内的 Wardrop 原则的一般化。由于拥堵的存在,该问题可能会导致非稳定设计,因此提出了一种来自平台的补贴机制来保证局部稳定性。在分支和约束框架的基础上,提出了一种新的匹配问题精确求解算法,该算法采用弗兰克-沃尔夫算法,并结合了拉格朗日松弛和次梯度优化,可保证匹配问题的最优性,但不能保证稳定性。我们提出了一种将稳定性条件和补贴设计结合起来的启发式方法,它既能获得具有全局稳定性的最优 MaaS 平台均衡解,也能获得可能需要补贴的可行局部稳定解。对于启发式,确定了获得精确解的最坏情况约束和条件。我们进行了两组可重复的数值实验。第一组在一个玩具网络上进行,验证了模型和算法,并说明了局部和全局稳定性的差异。第二组实验是在一个拥有 82 个节点和 748 个链接的扩大的苏福尔斯网络上进行的,实验得出了关于共享平台的运营商之间相互依赖的合作竞争关系模型的通用见解,处理了 MOD 服务中的拥塞效应、局部稳定性对投资影响的影响,并说明了在异质人群中可能出现的不公平现象。
On-demand mobility-as-a-Service platform assignment games with guaranteed stable outcomes
Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) systems are two-sided markets, with two mutually exclusive sets of agents, i.e., travelers/users and operators, forming a mobility ecosystem in which multiple operators compete or cooperate to serve customers under a governing platform provider. This study proposes a MaaS platform equilibrium model based on many-to-many assignment games incorporating both fixed-route transit services and mobility-on-demand (MOD) services. The matching problem is formulated as a convex multicommodity flow network design problem under congestion that captures the cost of accessing MOD services. The local stability conditions reflect a generalization of Wardrop's principles that include operators’ decisions. Due to the presence of congestion, the problem may result in non-stable designs, and a subsidy mechanism from the platform is proposed to guarantee local stability. A new exact solution algorithm to the matching problem is proposed based on a branch and bound framework with a Frank-Wolfe algorithm integrated with Lagrangian relaxation and subgradient optimization, which guarantees the optimality of the matching problem but not stability. A heuristic which integrates stability conditions and subsidy design is proposed, which reaches either an optimal MaaS platform equilibrium solution with global stability, or a feasible locally stable solution that may require subsidy. For the heuristic, a worst-case bound and condition for obtaining an exact solution are both identified. Two sets of reproducible numerical experiments are conducted. The first, on a toy network, verifies the model and algorithm, and illustrates the differences local and global stability. The second, on an expanded Sioux Falls network with 82 nodes and 748 links, derives generalizable insights about the model for coopetitive interdependencies between operators sharing the platform, handling congestion effects in MOD services, effects of local stability on investment impacts, and illustrating inequities that may arise under heterogeneous populations.
期刊介绍:
Transportation Research: Part B publishes papers on all methodological aspects of the subject, particularly those that require mathematical analysis. The general theme of the journal is the development and solution of problems that are adequately motivated to deal with important aspects of the design and/or analysis of transportation systems. Areas covered include: traffic flow; design and analysis of transportation networks; control and scheduling; optimization; queuing theory; logistics; supply chains; development and application of statistical, econometric and mathematical models to address transportation problems; cost models; pricing and/or investment; traveler or shipper behavior; cost-benefit methodologies.