倾向的六个角色

IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY MIND Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI:10.1093/mind/fzae047
Zach Barnett
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引用次数: 0

摘要

起初,你判断 p 是正确的,但后来你发现大多数专家都不同意。综合考虑后,你认为专家们可能是对的。尽管如此,在某种意义上,你仍然认为 p 是正确的。你还不知道你原来的推理有什么问题。在这种情况下,我们会说你 "倾向于 "p。本文将探讨这种倾向状态在认识论和更广义的认识论中可能扮演的各种角色。具体来说,本文将论证以下几点:(i) 倾向可以提高探究群体的准确性;(ii) 倾向可以支持哲学内部的理性参与,尽管分歧普遍存在;(iii) 倾向可以让我们理解两个人在 "和解 "之后仍可能继续存在分歧的一种重要方式;(iv) 倾向带有关于个人独立判断的信息,因此在更新他人观点时必须考虑到这一点;(vi) 意识到倾向与信念之间的区别,我们就能应对一个挑衅性的挑战,这个挑战声称批判性思维或 "为自己思考 "通常会降低预期的准确性,因此应予以阻止。
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Six Roles for Inclination
Initially, you judge that p. You then learn that most experts disagree. All things considered, you believe that the experts are probably right. Still, p continues to seem right to you, in some sense. You don’t yet see what, if anything, is wrong with your original reasoning. In such a case, we’ll say that you are ‘inclined’ toward p. This paper explores various roles that this state of inclination can play, both within epistemology and more broadly. Specifically, it will be argued that: (i) inclinations can promote the accuracy of inquiring groups; (ii) they can support rational participation within philosophy despite pervasive disagreement; (iii) they allow us to make sense of an important way in which two people can continue to disagree even after they ‘conciliate’; (iv) inclinations carry information about individuals’ independent judgments and for this reason must be accounted for when updating on the opinions of others; (v) inclinations are connected to understanding in a way that belief is not; (vi) and awareness of the inclination-belief distinction enables us to respond to a provocative challenge purporting to show that critical thinking, or ‘thinking for oneself’, typically reduces expected accuracy and hence should be discouraged.
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来源期刊
MIND
MIND PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
5.60%
发文量
47
期刊介绍: Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.
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