{"title":"制造商展厅部署与在线销售形式之间的互动","authors":"Yan Chen , Tao Zhang , Gang Li , Wei Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.tre.2024.103773","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Many manufacturers selling through online retail platforms are deploying physical showrooms to facilitate consumers’ learning about their products. To uncover the effects of the manufacturer-deployed showrooms on participants in a platform-based distribution channel, we establish a game-theoretic model wherein a manufacturer sells through an online retailer under either agency selling or wholesale selling, and consumers decide sequentially on showrooming and purchasing. We find that, firstly, despite the merits of showrooms in resolving consumers’ valuation uncertainty, the deployment of showrooms may unexpectedly engender more product returns (i.e., return exacerbation effect), which hurts the retailer under wholesale selling when the consumers’ travel cost is moderate. Second, the manufacturer under each selling format tends to benefit (suffer) from showrooms in the case of low (high) travel cost; in addition, the decrease in commission rate boosts the gain from showroom deployment, making the manufacturer under agency selling more likely to deploy showrooms, especially when the travel cost is moderate. Third, in anticipation of the manufacturer’s (not) deploying showrooms and the corresponding profit impacts, the channel members may adopt varying preferences for the selling format. Notably, they have aligned preferences for agency selling with medium low commission rate, while neither prefers agency selling with relatively high commission rate and travel cost. This study sheds light on the flourishing practice of manufacturer-deployed showrooms, clarifying their impacts on the platform-based distribution channel.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":49418,"journal":{"name":"Transportation Research Part E-Logistics and Transportation Review","volume":"192 ","pages":"Article 103773"},"PeriodicalIF":8.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The interaction between manufacturer’s showroom deployment and online selling formats\",\"authors\":\"Yan Chen , Tao Zhang , Gang Li , Wei Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.tre.2024.103773\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Many manufacturers selling through online retail platforms are deploying physical showrooms to facilitate consumers’ learning about their products. To uncover the effects of the manufacturer-deployed showrooms on participants in a platform-based distribution channel, we establish a game-theoretic model wherein a manufacturer sells through an online retailer under either agency selling or wholesale selling, and consumers decide sequentially on showrooming and purchasing. We find that, firstly, despite the merits of showrooms in resolving consumers’ valuation uncertainty, the deployment of showrooms may unexpectedly engender more product returns (i.e., return exacerbation effect), which hurts the retailer under wholesale selling when the consumers’ travel cost is moderate. Second, the manufacturer under each selling format tends to benefit (suffer) from showrooms in the case of low (high) travel cost; in addition, the decrease in commission rate boosts the gain from showroom deployment, making the manufacturer under agency selling more likely to deploy showrooms, especially when the travel cost is moderate. Third, in anticipation of the manufacturer’s (not) deploying showrooms and the corresponding profit impacts, the channel members may adopt varying preferences for the selling format. Notably, they have aligned preferences for agency selling with medium low commission rate, while neither prefers agency selling with relatively high commission rate and travel cost. This study sheds light on the flourishing practice of manufacturer-deployed showrooms, clarifying their impacts on the platform-based distribution channel.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":49418,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Transportation Research Part E-Logistics and Transportation Review\",\"volume\":\"192 \",\"pages\":\"Article 103773\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":8.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Transportation Research Part E-Logistics and Transportation Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"5\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1366554524003648\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"工程技术\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Transportation Research Part E-Logistics and Transportation Review","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1366554524003648","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The interaction between manufacturer’s showroom deployment and online selling formats
Many manufacturers selling through online retail platforms are deploying physical showrooms to facilitate consumers’ learning about their products. To uncover the effects of the manufacturer-deployed showrooms on participants in a platform-based distribution channel, we establish a game-theoretic model wherein a manufacturer sells through an online retailer under either agency selling or wholesale selling, and consumers decide sequentially on showrooming and purchasing. We find that, firstly, despite the merits of showrooms in resolving consumers’ valuation uncertainty, the deployment of showrooms may unexpectedly engender more product returns (i.e., return exacerbation effect), which hurts the retailer under wholesale selling when the consumers’ travel cost is moderate. Second, the manufacturer under each selling format tends to benefit (suffer) from showrooms in the case of low (high) travel cost; in addition, the decrease in commission rate boosts the gain from showroom deployment, making the manufacturer under agency selling more likely to deploy showrooms, especially when the travel cost is moderate. Third, in anticipation of the manufacturer’s (not) deploying showrooms and the corresponding profit impacts, the channel members may adopt varying preferences for the selling format. Notably, they have aligned preferences for agency selling with medium low commission rate, while neither prefers agency selling with relatively high commission rate and travel cost. This study sheds light on the flourishing practice of manufacturer-deployed showrooms, clarifying their impacts on the platform-based distribution channel.
期刊介绍:
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review is a reputable journal that publishes high-quality articles covering a wide range of topics in the field of logistics and transportation research. The journal welcomes submissions on various subjects, including transport economics, transport infrastructure and investment appraisal, evaluation of public policies related to transportation, empirical and analytical studies of logistics management practices and performance, logistics and operations models, and logistics and supply chain management.
Part E aims to provide informative and well-researched articles that contribute to the understanding and advancement of the field. The content of the journal is complementary to other prestigious journals in transportation research, such as Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Part B: Methodological, Part C: Emerging Technologies, Part D: Transport and Environment, and Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour. Together, these journals form a comprehensive and cohesive reference for current research in transportation science.