Behkish Nassirzadeh, Stefanos Leonardos, Albert Heinle, Anwar Hasan, Vijay Ganesh
{"title":"计数链:用于计数系统的去中心化 Oracle 网络","authors":"Behkish Nassirzadeh, Stefanos Leonardos, Albert Heinle, Anwar Hasan, Vijay Ganesh","doi":"arxiv-2409.11592","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Blockchain integration in industries like online advertising is hindered by\nits connectivity limitations to off-chain data. These industries heavily rely\non precise counting systems for collecting and analyzing off-chain data. This\nrequires mechanisms, often called oracles, to feed off-chain data into smart\ncontracts. However, current oracle solutions are ill-suited for counting\nsystems since the oracles do not know when to expect the data, posing a\nsignificant challenge. To address this, we present CountChain, a decentralized oracle network for\ncounting systems. In CountChain, data is received by all oracle nodes, and any\nnode can submit a proposition request. Each proposition contains enough data to\nevaluate the occurrence of an event. Only randomly selected nodes participate\nin a game to evaluate the truthfulness of each proposition by providing proof\nand some stake. Finally, the propositions with the outcome of True increment\nthe counter in a smart contract. Thus, instead of a contract calling oracles\nfor data, in CountChain, the oracles call a smart contract when the data is\navailable. Furthermore, we present a formal analysis and experimental\nevaluation of the system's parameters on over half a million data points to\nobtain optimal system parameters. In such conditions, our game-theoretical\nanalysis demonstrates that a Nash equilibrium exists wherein all rational\nparties participate with honesty.","PeriodicalId":501422,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing","volume":"93 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CountChain: A Decentralized Oracle Network for Counting Systems\",\"authors\":\"Behkish Nassirzadeh, Stefanos Leonardos, Albert Heinle, Anwar Hasan, Vijay Ganesh\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2409.11592\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Blockchain integration in industries like online advertising is hindered by\\nits connectivity limitations to off-chain data. These industries heavily rely\\non precise counting systems for collecting and analyzing off-chain data. This\\nrequires mechanisms, often called oracles, to feed off-chain data into smart\\ncontracts. However, current oracle solutions are ill-suited for counting\\nsystems since the oracles do not know when to expect the data, posing a\\nsignificant challenge. To address this, we present CountChain, a decentralized oracle network for\\ncounting systems. In CountChain, data is received by all oracle nodes, and any\\nnode can submit a proposition request. Each proposition contains enough data to\\nevaluate the occurrence of an event. Only randomly selected nodes participate\\nin a game to evaluate the truthfulness of each proposition by providing proof\\nand some stake. Finally, the propositions with the outcome of True increment\\nthe counter in a smart contract. Thus, instead of a contract calling oracles\\nfor data, in CountChain, the oracles call a smart contract when the data is\\navailable. Furthermore, we present a formal analysis and experimental\\nevaluation of the system's parameters on over half a million data points to\\nobtain optimal system parameters. In such conditions, our game-theoretical\\nanalysis demonstrates that a Nash equilibrium exists wherein all rational\\nparties participate with honesty.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501422,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing\",\"volume\":\"93 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.11592\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.11592","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
CountChain: A Decentralized Oracle Network for Counting Systems
Blockchain integration in industries like online advertising is hindered by
its connectivity limitations to off-chain data. These industries heavily rely
on precise counting systems for collecting and analyzing off-chain data. This
requires mechanisms, often called oracles, to feed off-chain data into smart
contracts. However, current oracle solutions are ill-suited for counting
systems since the oracles do not know when to expect the data, posing a
significant challenge. To address this, we present CountChain, a decentralized oracle network for
counting systems. In CountChain, data is received by all oracle nodes, and any
node can submit a proposition request. Each proposition contains enough data to
evaluate the occurrence of an event. Only randomly selected nodes participate
in a game to evaluate the truthfulness of each proposition by providing proof
and some stake. Finally, the propositions with the outcome of True increment
the counter in a smart contract. Thus, instead of a contract calling oracles
for data, in CountChain, the oracles call a smart contract when the data is
available. Furthermore, we present a formal analysis and experimental
evaluation of the system's parameters on over half a million data points to
obtain optimal system parameters. In such conditions, our game-theoretical
analysis demonstrates that a Nash equilibrium exists wherein all rational
parties participate with honesty.