三梯队耐用品供应链中的战略库存管理

IF 6.7 2区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT Omega-international Journal of Management Science Pub Date : 2024-09-29 DOI:10.1016/j.omega.2024.103204
Jin Li , Yanan Chen , Yi Liao , Victor Shi , Haixia Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

企业可以持有战略库存,以便与供应商就批发价格讨价还价。在本文中,我们建立了一个由供应商、批发商和零售商组成的三梯队耐用品供应链模型,其中后两家公司可以选择持有战略库存。我们的主要发现如下。首先,与相关文献相反,我们的研究表明,无论批发商是否持有战略库存,零售商使用战略库存都会使所有供应链成员受益。其次,当持有成本较低时,批发商和零售商的战略库存会相互抑制。否则,零售战略库存会刺激批发战略库存。第三,零售商采用战略库存后,引入批发战略库存会损害供应链各成员的利益。但是,批发商采用战略库存后,引入零售战略库存会使所有成员受益。对于整个供应链来说,只在零售商处持有战略库存是最优选择。第四,当产品耐用性较高时,供应商可能会受到批发商战略库存的影响。此外,零售商的战略库存可以解决与耐用品相关的时间不一致问题。最后,我们对主要模型进行了扩展,以考虑多个零售商和不同的持有成本。我们的分析证实了我们的主要发现和管理见解的稳健性。
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Managing strategic inventories in a three-echelon supply chain of durable goods
Firms can hold strategic inventory to bargain with their suppliers about wholesale prices. In this paper, we model a three-echelon durable goods supply chain consisting of a supplier, a wholesaler, and a retailer, where the latter two firms can choose to hold strategic inventory. Our major findings are as follows. First, contrary to the literature, our study shows that the retailer's use of strategic inventory benefits all supply chain members, irrespective of whether the wholesaler holds strategic inventory. Second, the strategic inventories of the wholesaler and the retailer suppress each other when the holding cost is low. Otherwise, the retail strategic inventory can stimulate the wholesale strategic inventory. Third, after the retailer employs strategic inventory, introducing wholesale strategic inventory will harm each supply chain member. However, after the wholesaler employs strategic inventory, introducing retail strategic inventory can benefit all members. For the entire supply chain, holding strategic inventory exclusively at the retailer is optimal. Fourth, when product durability is high, the supplier may suffer from the wholesaler's strategic inventory. Additionally, the retailer's strategic inventory can solve the time inconsistency problem associated with durable goods. Finally, we extend our main model to consider multiple retailers and different holding costs. Our analysis confirms the robustness of our major findings and managerial insights.
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来源期刊
Omega-international Journal of Management Science
Omega-international Journal of Management Science 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
13.80
自引率
11.60%
发文量
130
审稿时长
56 days
期刊介绍: Omega reports on developments in management, including the latest research results and applications. Original contributions and review articles describe the state of the art in specific fields or functions of management, while there are shorter critical assessments of particular management techniques. Other features of the journal are the "Memoranda" section for short communications and "Feedback", a correspondence column. Omega is both stimulating reading and an important source for practising managers, specialists in management services, operational research workers and management scientists, management consultants, academics, students and research personnel throughout the world. The material published is of high quality and relevance, written in a manner which makes it accessible to all of this wide-ranging readership. Preference will be given to papers with implications to the practice of management. Submissions of purely theoretical papers are discouraged. The review of material for publication in the journal reflects this aim.
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