企业社会责任和内部人视野

IF 7.2 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-11-15 DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102696
Mark Shackleton, Yaqiong Yao, Ziran Zuo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们的研究表明,内部人视野与公司的企业社会责任(CSR)绩效之间存在正相关关系。这种正相关关系可能是由良好的内部治理而非代理问题驱动的。为了支持因果关系的解释,我们将管理者职业生涯期限的缩短和拒绝不可避免的信息披露原则作为内部人期限的外生冲击。我们发现,当公司拥有较多的长期和有社会责任感的机构投资者、内部人签署长期薪酬合同以及公司面临较小的收购压力时,观察到的积极效应会更强。我们使用各种企业社会责任原始指标记录了长线内部人的实际效果。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,内部人的长期导向可以促进企业社会责任。
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Corporate social responsibility and insider horizon
We show a positive relation between insider horizon and a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. This positive relation is likely driven by good internal governance rather than agency problems. To support a causal interpretation, we adopt managerial career horizon reductions and the rejection of inevitable disclosure doctrine as exogenous shocks to insider horizon. We find that the observed positive effects are stronger when firms have higher ownership of long-term and socially responsible institutional investors, when insiders sign long-term compensation contracts, and when firms face less takeover pressure. We document the real effects of long-horizon insiders using various raw CSR metrics. Overall, our results indicate that insiders' long-term orientation can promote CSR.
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来源期刊
Journal of Corporate Finance
Journal of Corporate Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
11.80
自引率
3.30%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.
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