{"title":"采用不同在线平台智能回收和销售模式的绿色闭环供应链动态分析","authors":"Xiaohong Chen , Cheng Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.cie.2024.110748","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Global warming and waste product recycling have become increasingly serious. Green innovation of a closed-loop supply chain (GCLSC) and selection of on-line platform recycling and sales models need to be solved as a matter of urgency. To achieve this purpose, dynamic influences of green innovation, platform smart marketing, and recycling investments on goodwill are considered. Dynamic game models are used to solve the equilibrium solutions and optimal trajectories under different models, and influences of commission rates on the profits and key variables are compared via numerical simulations. The results show that the evolution paths of goodwill under the four decision models all descend at first, then stabilize; the optimal strategy can be selected based on the intervals of sales and recycling commission rates. Under the dual-agency model (agency selling and platform agency recycling (Model AP)), the higher the sales commission rate (SCR) is, the more likely the manufacturer chooses the reselling and platform agency recycling (Model RP), which, however, may lead to insufficient green innovation investment. The higher the RCR, the greater the platform profit when selecting agency selling. The system profit first increases, then decreases with growing sales commission, and Model AP represents the optimal strategy. The research offers reference for the selection of operation models and investment decision, is conducive to improving the enterprise goodwill, and promotes the sustainable development of the GCLSC.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":55220,"journal":{"name":"Computers & Industrial Engineering","volume":"200 ","pages":"Article 110748"},"PeriodicalIF":6.7000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A dynamic analysis of a green closed-loop supply chain with different on-line platform smart recycling and selling models\",\"authors\":\"Xiaohong Chen , Cheng Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.cie.2024.110748\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Global warming and waste product recycling have become increasingly serious. Green innovation of a closed-loop supply chain (GCLSC) and selection of on-line platform recycling and sales models need to be solved as a matter of urgency. To achieve this purpose, dynamic influences of green innovation, platform smart marketing, and recycling investments on goodwill are considered. Dynamic game models are used to solve the equilibrium solutions and optimal trajectories under different models, and influences of commission rates on the profits and key variables are compared via numerical simulations. The results show that the evolution paths of goodwill under the four decision models all descend at first, then stabilize; the optimal strategy can be selected based on the intervals of sales and recycling commission rates. Under the dual-agency model (agency selling and platform agency recycling (Model AP)), the higher the sales commission rate (SCR) is, the more likely the manufacturer chooses the reselling and platform agency recycling (Model RP), which, however, may lead to insufficient green innovation investment. The higher the RCR, the greater the platform profit when selecting agency selling. The system profit first increases, then decreases with growing sales commission, and Model AP represents the optimal strategy. The research offers reference for the selection of operation models and investment decision, is conducive to improving the enterprise goodwill, and promotes the sustainable development of the GCLSC.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":55220,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Computers & Industrial Engineering\",\"volume\":\"200 \",\"pages\":\"Article 110748\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-02-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Computers & Industrial Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"5\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360835224008702\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"工程技术\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Computers & Industrial Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360835224008702","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
A dynamic analysis of a green closed-loop supply chain with different on-line platform smart recycling and selling models
Global warming and waste product recycling have become increasingly serious. Green innovation of a closed-loop supply chain (GCLSC) and selection of on-line platform recycling and sales models need to be solved as a matter of urgency. To achieve this purpose, dynamic influences of green innovation, platform smart marketing, and recycling investments on goodwill are considered. Dynamic game models are used to solve the equilibrium solutions and optimal trajectories under different models, and influences of commission rates on the profits and key variables are compared via numerical simulations. The results show that the evolution paths of goodwill under the four decision models all descend at first, then stabilize; the optimal strategy can be selected based on the intervals of sales and recycling commission rates. Under the dual-agency model (agency selling and platform agency recycling (Model AP)), the higher the sales commission rate (SCR) is, the more likely the manufacturer chooses the reselling and platform agency recycling (Model RP), which, however, may lead to insufficient green innovation investment. The higher the RCR, the greater the platform profit when selecting agency selling. The system profit first increases, then decreases with growing sales commission, and Model AP represents the optimal strategy. The research offers reference for the selection of operation models and investment decision, is conducive to improving the enterprise goodwill, and promotes the sustainable development of the GCLSC.
期刊介绍:
Computers & Industrial Engineering (CAIE) is dedicated to researchers, educators, and practitioners in industrial engineering and related fields. Pioneering the integration of computers in research, education, and practice, industrial engineering has evolved to make computers and electronic communication integral to its domain. CAIE publishes original contributions focusing on the development of novel computerized methodologies to address industrial engineering problems. It also highlights the applications of these methodologies to issues within the broader industrial engineering and associated communities. The journal actively encourages submissions that push the boundaries of fundamental theories and concepts in industrial engineering techniques.