Subsidies for shared private electric vehicle chargers: A three-level Stackelberg game analysis

Currently, governments and platforms are exploring subsidy schemes to encourage private charging pile sharing (PCPS), which is essential for the sustainable development of the electric vehicle industry. Nonetheless, the specific modes and their impacts on stakeholders’ decision-making remain unclear. We establish a three-level Stackelberg game model to analyze the interactions among government, platform, and private charger owners. Four practice-driven modes are proposed: both government and platform provide subsidies (BS), government provides subsidies (GS), platform provides subsidies (PS), and no subsidy (NS). Results reveal that BS works better when platform revenue increases, while GS performs better when government revenue rises; Enhancing PCPS benefits and data value promotes cost-effectiveness in BS and GS modes. Conversely, raising platform service fees hinders PCPS and reduces effectiveness; As platform revenue grows, platforms provide subsidies spontaneously, enabling the gradual withdrawal of government subsidies. These findings offer practical insights for policymakers to design targeted and efficient subsidies.