价格不合适?医院价格和私人投保人的医疗支出。

IF 11.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Quarterly Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-02-01 Epub Date: 2018-09-04 DOI:10.1093/qje/qjy020
Zack Cooper, Stuart V Craig, Martin Gaynor, John Van Reenen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们利用涵盖美国 28% 由雇主提供医疗保险的个人的保险理赔数据,研究了私人投保人医疗支出的变化,考察了投保人-医院合同的结构,并分析了全国各地医院价格的变化。在不同的地理区域,每名私人保险受益人的医疗支出相差三倍,与医疗保险支出的相关性很低。对于私人投保人来说,一半的支出变化是由不同地区的价格变化造成的,一半是由数量变化造成的。不同地区、地区内不同医院、甚至医院内部的价格都有很大差异。例如,即使是下肢磁共振成像这种几乎同质的服务,在横截面中,病例总价格变化的五分之一也发生在医院内部。医院市场结构与价格水平和合同结构密切相关。垄断医院的价格比有四个或更多竞争对手的市场高出 12%。垄断医院的合同也会给保险公司带来更多的风险(例如,它们有更多的病例,其价格是按其收费的一定比例确定的)。而在集中的保险公司市场,情况恰恰相反--医院的价格更低,承担的财务风险更大。在对 2007 年至 2011 年间发生的 366 起并购案进行研究后,我们发现,当并购医院的地理位置较近(如相距 5 英里或更近)时,价格会上涨 6% 以上,而当医院的地理位置较远(如相距 25 英里以上)时,价格则不会上涨。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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THE PRICE AIN'T RIGHT? HOSPITAL PRICES AND HEALTH SPENDING ON THE PRIVATELY INSURED.

We use insurance claims data covering 28% of individuals with employer-sponsored health insurance in the United States to study the variation in health spending on the privately insured, examine the structure of insurer-hospital contracts, and analyze the variation in hospital prices across the nation. Health spending per privately insured beneficiary differs by a factor of three across geographic areas and has a very low correlation with Medicare spending. For the privately insured, half of the spending variation is driven by price variation across regions, and half is driven by quantity variation. Prices vary substantially across regions, across hospitals within regions, and even within hospitals. For example, even for a nearly homogeneous service such as lower-limb magnetic resonance imaging, about a fifth of the total case-level price variation occurs within a hospital in the cross section. Hospital market structure is strongly associated with price levels and contract structure. Prices at monopoly hospitals are 12% higher than those in markets with four or more rivals. Monopoly hospitals also have contracts that load more risk on insurers (e.g., they have more cases with prices set as a share of their charges). In concentrated insurer markets the opposite occurs-hospitals have lower prices and bear more financial risk. Examining the 366 mergers and acquisitions that occurred between 2007 and 2011, we find that prices increased by over 6% when the merging hospitals were geographically close (e.g., 5 miles or less apart), but not when the hospitals were geographically distant (e.g., over 25 miles apart).

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来源期刊
CiteScore
24.20
自引率
2.20%
发文量
42
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Journal of Economics stands as the oldest professional journal of economics in the English language. Published under the editorial guidance of Harvard University's Department of Economics, it comprehensively covers all aspects of the field. Esteemed by professional and academic economists as well as students worldwide, QJE holds unparalleled value in the economic discourse.
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