高层管理团队特征与权责发生制盈余管理

Yu-Ting Hsieh , Tsung-Kang Chen , Yi-Jie Tseng , Ruey-Ching Lin
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引用次数: 23

摘要

本研究以2006年至2010年4791家台湾上市公司为研究对象,探讨高层管理团队知识与平均任期对权责发生制盈余管理的影响。知识水平越高(教育程度越高、会计专业知识越丰富、之前的高层管理经验越丰富)、平均任期越长的TMT成员业绩越好、声誉越高,并且对盈余操纵的诉讼成本意识越强;因此,它们降低了管理者管理收益的激励(激励-减少效应)。另一方面,这些TMT成员也可能变得根深蒂固,并参与更多的收益操纵(巩固效应)。实证结果表明,企业的TMT知识和平均任期与可操纵性应计利润呈负相关,表明激励减少效应强于堑沟增强效应,这使得TMT成员不太可能参与盈余管理。此外,当采用不同的盈余管理措施和可疑公司分析,以及考虑内生性问题时,上述结果是稳健的。最后,研究表明,创始家族的存在可能会降低TMT知识和平均任期对盈余管理的影响。
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Top Management Team Characteristics and Accrual-Based Earnings Management

This study examines how top management team (TMT) knowledge and average tenure affect accrual-based earnings management by investigating 4791 Taiwanese listed companies from 2006 to 2010. TMT members with more knowledge (higher education level, more accounting expertise, and greater prior top management experience) and longer average tenure have better performances and higher reputations, and are more aware of the litigation costs of earnings manipulations; therefore, they reduce managers' incentives to manage earnings (incentive-reduction effect). On the other hand, these TMT members are also likely to become entrenched and engage in more earnings manipulations (entrenchment-enhancing effect). The empirical results show that firms' TMT knowledge and average tenure are negatively associated with discretionary accruals, suggesting that the incentive-reduction effect is stronger than the entrenchment-enhancing effect, which makes TMT members less likely to engage in earnings management. Moreover, the above results are robust when employing different earnings management measures and suspect firm analyses, as well as considering endogeneity issues. Finally, the study suggests that the presence of a founding family may reduce the influences of TMT knowledge and average tenure on earnings management.

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