{"title":"缩小性别薪酬差距:分析师覆盖率、利益相关者关注度和高管薪酬中的性别差异","authors":"Massimo Maoret, Solon Moreira, Halil Sabanci","doi":"10.1177/01708406231200725","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The gender pay gap among firms’ upper echelons is a prominent issue not only because it concerns equality in the workplace, but also because it may impact firms’ culture and performance. Responding to calls to better understand how stakeholder expectations and pressures might influence the gender pay gap, this study examines the role of a key stakeholder group, i.e., financial analysts, in curbing executive gender pay gap. Drawing on the stakeholder and attention-based views of the firm, we contend that analyst coverage may counter the pay gap by a) raising other stakeholders’ attention on discriminatory pay setting practices; and b) reducing information asymmetries in the executive labor market. Both firm- and individual-level econometric analyses on a sample of 38,211 executives working in 3,473 firms support our hypothesis: an increase in analyst firm coverage helps to reduce the gender pay gap among the top executives of S&P 1500 firms between 1992 and 2016. Post-hoc analyses - that use the closure of brokerage houses as an exogeneous shock - lend further causal support to our claims. Our results advance the literature at the nexus of the stakeholder theory and attention-based view of the firm by unveiling the role of intermediaries in channeling the limited stakeholder attention to certain firms, contributing to the development of a stakeholder-based theory of executive pay.","PeriodicalId":48423,"journal":{"name":"Organization Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Closing the Gender Pay Gap: Analyst Coverage, Stakeholder Attention, and Gender Differences in Executive Compensation\",\"authors\":\"Massimo Maoret, Solon Moreira, Halil Sabanci\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/01708406231200725\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The gender pay gap among firms’ upper echelons is a prominent issue not only because it concerns equality in the workplace, but also because it may impact firms’ culture and performance. Responding to calls to better understand how stakeholder expectations and pressures might influence the gender pay gap, this study examines the role of a key stakeholder group, i.e., financial analysts, in curbing executive gender pay gap. Drawing on the stakeholder and attention-based views of the firm, we contend that analyst coverage may counter the pay gap by a) raising other stakeholders’ attention on discriminatory pay setting practices; and b) reducing information asymmetries in the executive labor market. Both firm- and individual-level econometric analyses on a sample of 38,211 executives working in 3,473 firms support our hypothesis: an increase in analyst firm coverage helps to reduce the gender pay gap among the top executives of S&P 1500 firms between 1992 and 2016. Post-hoc analyses - that use the closure of brokerage houses as an exogeneous shock - lend further causal support to our claims. Our results advance the literature at the nexus of the stakeholder theory and attention-based view of the firm by unveiling the role of intermediaries in channeling the limited stakeholder attention to certain firms, contributing to the development of a stakeholder-based theory of executive pay.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48423,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Organization Studies\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Organization Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/01708406231200725\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"MANAGEMENT\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Organization Studies","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01708406231200725","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
Closing the Gender Pay Gap: Analyst Coverage, Stakeholder Attention, and Gender Differences in Executive Compensation
The gender pay gap among firms’ upper echelons is a prominent issue not only because it concerns equality in the workplace, but also because it may impact firms’ culture and performance. Responding to calls to better understand how stakeholder expectations and pressures might influence the gender pay gap, this study examines the role of a key stakeholder group, i.e., financial analysts, in curbing executive gender pay gap. Drawing on the stakeholder and attention-based views of the firm, we contend that analyst coverage may counter the pay gap by a) raising other stakeholders’ attention on discriminatory pay setting practices; and b) reducing information asymmetries in the executive labor market. Both firm- and individual-level econometric analyses on a sample of 38,211 executives working in 3,473 firms support our hypothesis: an increase in analyst firm coverage helps to reduce the gender pay gap among the top executives of S&P 1500 firms between 1992 and 2016. Post-hoc analyses - that use the closure of brokerage houses as an exogeneous shock - lend further causal support to our claims. Our results advance the literature at the nexus of the stakeholder theory and attention-based view of the firm by unveiling the role of intermediaries in channeling the limited stakeholder attention to certain firms, contributing to the development of a stakeholder-based theory of executive pay.
期刊介绍:
Organisation Studies (OS) aims to promote the understanding of organizations, organizing and the organized, and the social relevance of that understanding. It encourages the interplay between theorizing and empirical research, in the belief that they should be mutually informative. It is a multidisciplinary peer-reviewed journal which is open to contributions of high quality, from any perspective relevant to the field and from any country. Organization Studies is, in particular, a supranational journal which gives special attention to national and cultural similarities and differences worldwide. This is reflected by its international editorial board and publisher and its collaboration with EGOS, the European Group for Organizational Studies. OS publishes papers that fully or partly draw on empirical data to make their contribution to organization theory and practice. Thus, OS welcomes work that in any form draws on empirical work to make strong theoretical and empirical contributions. If your paper is not drawing on empirical data in any form, we advise you to submit your work to Organization Theory – another journal under the auspices of the European Group for Organizational Studies (EGOS) – instead.