金融教父利维坦:国有独资企业的债务优势

IF 5.7 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Global Strategy Journal Pub Date : 2022-08-06 DOI:10.1002/gsj.1457
Mauricio Jara, Aldo Musacchio, Rodrigo Wagner
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引用次数: 0

摘要

研究摘要 我们研究了国有独资企业(WSOE)因隐含的主权违约保险而具有的债务优势。我们的模型解释了增加债券收益率优势的条件。在我们的全球债券样本中,我们发现国有独资企业发行的债券到期收益率比可比公司低 57 个基点。当我们以部分国有企业为基准时,这种影响甚至更大--这种影响大到足以克服外资企业的责任。这种较低的债务融资成本在危机期间更为强劲,但对于信用度较低的主权国家来说却消失了。较低的债务成本使中位数全资国有企业的利润 "膨胀 "了 13%。 管理总结 我们研究了国有独资企业(WSOE)在发行债券时,是否会因为认为其债务有违约隐性保险而享有比私营企业更低的资本成本。我们建立了一个模型并进行了实证检验,结果表明全资国有企业发行的债券相对于私营企业发行的债券享有 57 个基点的折扣。即使与公司在海外发行债券时支付的溢价相比,这一折扣也是很大的。我们还发现,在危机期间,由于投资者更看重隐性保险,这种折扣会更大,但对于信用度低的政府发行的债券,这种折扣会消失。我们估计,对于样本中的中位 WSOE 来说,较低的资本成本使利润增加了 13%。
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Leviathan as a financial godfather: Debt advantages of wholly state-owned enterprises

Research Summary

We examine the debt advantages of wholly owned state-owned enterprises (WSOEs), due to an implicit sovereign insurance against default. Our model explains conditions that increase those advantages in bond yields. In our global sample of bonds, we find that bond issues of WSOEs, have a 57 bps discount in their yield to maturity vis-à-vis comparable corporations. The effect is even larger when we benchmark against partial state-owned firms—an effect large enough to overcome the liability of foreignness. This cheaper debt finance is stronger during crises yet disappears for sovereigns with low creditworthiness. This lower cost of debt “inflates” the profits of the median WSOE by 13%.

Managerial Summary

We examine if wholly owned state-owned enterprises (WSOEs) enjoy a lower cost of capital vis-à-vis their private counterparts when issuing bonds due to the perception that their debt is implicitly insured against default. We develop a model and undertake empirical tests to show that bond issues of WSOEs enjoy a 57 bps discount relative to private issues. This discount is large even relative to the premia companies pay when issuing bonds abroad. We also find that during crises the discount is larger as investors value the implicit insurance even more, but that it disappears for bond issues of governments with low creditworthiness. We estimate that for the median WSOE in our sample, the lower cost of capital inflates profits by 13%.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.20
自引率
11.80%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: The Global Strategy Journal is a premier platform dedicated to publishing highly influential managerially-oriented global strategy research worldwide. Covering themes such as international and global strategy, assembling the global enterprise, and strategic management, GSJ plays a vital role in advancing our understanding of global business dynamics.
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