Oversight of Police Intelligence: A Complex Web, but Is It Enough?

Abstract This article analyzes the jurisdiction, function, powers, and expertise of oversight mechanisms with reference to capacity to oversee the legality of emerging police intelligence practices such as facial recognition, social media analytics, and predictive policing. It argues that oversight of such practices raises distinct issues ranging from the general oversight of policing, given the secrecy associated with police intelligence generally, to the use of complex software in particular. It combines doctrinal analysis with analysis of interviews with policing intelligence analysts, intelligence managers, lawyers, and IT professionals in three jurisdictions: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. It brings together the roles of a variety of entities involved directly or indirectly in oversight; in particular, professional standards units, independent police and public sector oversight bodies, intelligence oversight, privacy and human rights regulators, courts, political bodies, contracting parties, and ad hoc bodies. Understanding the web of oversight as a whole, and comparing across jurisdictions, it concludes with specific proposals for reform.