提高标准:认证门槛和市场结果

IF 2.2 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS American Economic Journal-Microeconomics Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI:10.1257/mic.20210179
Xiang Hui, M. Saeedi, G. Spagnolo, S. Tadelis
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引用次数: 5

摘要

值得信赖的第三方对卖家的认证有助于缓解市场中的信息不对称,但人们对认证门槛对市场结果的影响知之甚少。利用eBay上的政策变化,我们研究了更具选择性的认证阈值如何影响质量和在职者行为的分布。我们开发了一个程式化模型,显示选择性的变化如何改变市场中质量和价格的分布。利用eBay.com上数百个在线类别的丰富数据,我们发现该模型的假设得到了支持。我们的研究结果有助于为电子和其他市场的认证选择性设计提供信息。(JEL D82、L11、L15、L86)
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Raising the Bar: Certification Thresholds and Market Outcomes
Certification of sellers by trusted third parties helps alleviate information asymmetries in markets, yet little is known about the impact of a certification’s threshold on market outcomes. Exploiting a policy change on eBay, we study how a more selective certification threshold affects the distribution of quality and incumbent behavior. We develop a stylized model that shows how changes in selectivity change the distribution of quality and prices in markets. Using rich data from hundreds of online categories on eBay.com , we find support for the model’s hypotheses. Our results help inform the design of certification selectivity in electronic and other markets. (JEL D82, L11, L15, L86)
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
4.20%
发文量
86
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