Manufacturers of durable goods can encourage consumers facing transaction costs to upgrade by accepting used units as trade-ins. These “buyback schemes” increase demand for new units, but increase the supply of used units if trade-ins are resold. I investigate the equilibrium effects of buyback schemes in the market for business jets. I find that buyback increases manufacturer revenue by 7.2 percent at fixed prices. However, in equilibrium this revenue gain is diminished by 43 percent due to substitution away from new jets among first time buyers. I show how the size of this cannibalization effect depends on preference heterogeneity. (JEL D23, G34, L13, L62)
{"title":"Trade-ins and Transaction Costs in the Market for Used Business Jets","authors":"Charles Hodgson","doi":"10.1257/mic.20190325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190325","url":null,"abstract":"Manufacturers of durable goods can encourage consumers facing transaction costs to upgrade by accepting used units as trade-ins. These “buyback schemes” increase demand for new units, but increase the supply of used units if trade-ins are resold. I investigate the equilibrium effects of buyback schemes in the market for business jets. I find that buyback increases manufacturer revenue by 7.2 percent at fixed prices. However, in equilibrium this revenue gain is diminished by 43 percent due to substitution away from new jets among first time buyers. I show how the size of this cannibalization effect depends on preference heterogeneity. (JEL D23, G34, L13, L62)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"45 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135370731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The canonical direct-elicitation approach for measuring individuals’ valuations for goods is the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure, which generates willingness-to-pay (WTP) values that are imprecise and systematically biased. We show that enhancing elicited WTP values with supervised machine learning (SML) can improve estimates of peoples’ out-of-sample purchase behavior. Furthermore, swapping WTP data with choice data generated from a simple task leads to comparable performance. We quantify the benefit of using various SML methods in conjunction with using different types of data. Our results suggest that prices set by SML would increase revenue by 29 percent over using the stated WTP, with the same data. (JEL C45, C91, D12)
{"title":"Supervised Machine Learning for Eliciting Individual Demand","authors":"John A. Clithero, Jae Joon Lee, Joshua Tasoff","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210069","url":null,"abstract":"The canonical direct-elicitation approach for measuring individuals’ valuations for goods is the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure, which generates willingness-to-pay (WTP) values that are imprecise and systematically biased. We show that enhancing elicited WTP values with supervised machine learning (SML) can improve estimates of peoples’ out-of-sample purchase behavior. Furthermore, swapping WTP data with choice data generated from a simple task leads to comparable performance. We quantify the benefit of using various SML methods in conjunction with using different types of data. Our results suggest that prices set by SML would increase revenue by 29 percent over using the stated WTP, with the same data. (JEL C45, C91, D12)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"47 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136102267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Entry of new firms onto a platform has an ambivalent effect on the incumbent firms operating on the platform: the main tension lies between the negative effects of increased competitive pressure and positive indirect network effects. This paper empirically studies the net effect of these countervailing forces and its dependence on firm quality, using a quasi-exogenous shock on a large online platform. On average, market expansion favors incumbents, though the average effect masks substantial heterogeneity: high-quality incumbents experience significant increases in sales and revenue, whereas low-quality firms perform unambiguously worse. Lastly, the paper explores the main mechanisms and firms’ responses. (JEL D22, D85, L14, L15, L84)
{"title":"Smaller Slices of a Growing Pie: The Effects of Entry in Platform Markets","authors":"Oren Reshef","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220055","url":null,"abstract":"Entry of new firms onto a platform has an ambivalent effect on the incumbent firms operating on the platform: the main tension lies between the negative effects of increased competitive pressure and positive indirect network effects. This paper empirically studies the net effect of these countervailing forces and its dependence on firm quality, using a quasi-exogenous shock on a large online platform. On average, market expansion favors incumbents, though the average effect masks substantial heterogeneity: high-quality incumbents experience significant increases in sales and revenue, whereas low-quality firms perform unambiguously worse. Lastly, the paper explores the main mechanisms and firms’ responses. (JEL D22, D85, L14, L15, L84)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"140 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135161005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor’s reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator’s disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor’s reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that feature verifiable disclosure destroy reputational incentives. The regulator discloses more aggressively when she has better enforcement tools. (JEL D82, D83, G21, G28, G38, M42)
{"title":"Monitor Reputation and Transparency","authors":"Ivan Marinovic, Martin Szydlowski","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220006","url":null,"abstract":"We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor’s reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator’s disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor’s reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that feature verifiable disclosure destroy reputational incentives. The regulator discloses more aggressively when she has better enforcement tools. (JEL D82, D83, G21, G28, G38, M42)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"46 16","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136103380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (i) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (ii) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This reflects the improvisational nature of teams’ decision making. (iii) Increasing cooperation was primarily driven by teams unilaterally cooperating in the hope of inducing their opponent to cooperate. (JEL C72, C73, C92)
{"title":"Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games","authors":"David J. Cooper, John H. Kagel","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210012","url":null,"abstract":"We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (i) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (ii) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This reflects the improvisational nature of teams’ decision making. (iii) Increasing cooperation was primarily driven by teams unilaterally cooperating in the hope of inducing their opponent to cooperate. (JEL C72, C73, C92)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135161011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider the single-sector version of the Melitz-Ottaviano model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. We characterize the first-best and market allocations. We find that the market provides the first-best level of entry but too little selection; hence, the market provides too many varieties and too little aggregate quantity, and allocates too little (much) production to low (high) cost realizations. Allowing for a broad family of quantity allocation functions, we establish sufficient conditions for the global optimality of the first-best solution. Several important extensions are also examined. (JEL D21, D43, D50, D60)
{"title":"Monopolistic Competition and Efficiency under Firm Heterogeneity and Nonadditive Preferences","authors":"Kyle Bagwell, Seung Hoon Lee","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210099","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the single-sector version of the Melitz-Ottaviano model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. We characterize the first-best and market allocations. We find that the market provides the first-best level of entry but too little selection; hence, the market provides too many varieties and too little aggregate quantity, and allocates too little (much) production to low (high) cost realizations. Allowing for a broad family of quantity allocation functions, we establish sufficient conditions for the global optimality of the first-best solution. Several important extensions are also examined. (JEL D21, D43, D50, D60)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"134 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135161015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide a general framework to analyze competition between any number of symmetric two-sided transaction platforms, in which buyers and sellers can multihome. We show how key primitives such as the number of platforms, the fraction of buyers that find multihoming costly, the value of transactions, and the degree of user heterogeneity jointly determine the level and structure of platform fees. Even though platform entry always reduces the total fee level, whether it shifts the fee structure in favor of buyers or sellers depends on whether most of the buyers are singlehoming or multihoming. (JEL D43, L11, L13, L40)
{"title":"Multihoming and Oligopolistic Platform Competition","authors":"Tat-How Teh, Chunchun Liu, Julian Wright, Junjie Zhou","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210324","url":null,"abstract":"We provide a general framework to analyze competition between any number of symmetric two-sided transaction platforms, in which buyers and sellers can multihome. We show how key primitives such as the number of platforms, the fraction of buyers that find multihoming costly, the value of transactions, and the degree of user heterogeneity jointly determine the level and structure of platform fees. Even though platform entry always reduces the total fee level, whether it shifts the fee structure in favor of buyers or sellers depends on whether most of the buyers are singlehoming or multihoming. (JEL D43, L11, L13, L40)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"51 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135370840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose a model of how multiple societies respond to a common crisis. A government faces a “damned-either-way” policymaking dilemma: aggressive intervention contains the crisis, but the resulting good outcome makes people skeptical about the costly response; light intervention worsens the crisis and causes the government to be faulted for not doing enough. When multiple societies encounter the crisis sequentially, due to this policymaking dilemma, late societies may underperform despite having more information, while early societies can benefit from a dynamic counterfactual effect. (JEL D72, D82, D83, H12)
{"title":"A Model of Sequential Crisis Management","authors":"Fei Li, Jidong Zhou","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220107","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a model of how multiple societies respond to a common crisis. A government faces a “damned-either-way” policymaking dilemma: aggressive intervention contains the crisis, but the resulting good outcome makes people skeptical about the costly response; light intervention worsens the crisis and causes the government to be faulted for not doing enough. When multiple societies encounter the crisis sequentially, due to this policymaking dilemma, late societies may underperform despite having more information, while early societies can benefit from a dynamic counterfactual effect. (JEL D72, D82, D83, H12)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"11 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135370737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Néstor Duch-Brown, Lukasz Grzybowski, André Romahn, Frank Verboven
We develop a framework to evaluate the impact of market integration, accounting for spillovers between multiple distribution channels. We adapt the standard random coefficients logit demand model to allow for substitution between channels and consumer arbitrage across countries. We apply our framework to the European portable PC market, where geoblocking practices that restrict online cross-border trade have recently been banned. Consumers in high income countries gain most from price convergence, while consumers in other countries may be worse off. The total consumer and welfare gains from online market integration are more modest and mainly due to increased product choice rather than reduced price discrimination. (JEL F13, F14, L13, L63, L81)
{"title":"Evaluating the Impact of Online Market Integration—Evidence from the EU Portable PC Market","authors":"Néstor Duch-Brown, Lukasz Grzybowski, André Romahn, Frank Verboven","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200254","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a framework to evaluate the impact of market integration, accounting for spillovers between multiple distribution channels. We adapt the standard random coefficients logit demand model to allow for substitution between channels and consumer arbitrage across countries. We apply our framework to the European portable PC market, where geoblocking practices that restrict online cross-border trade have recently been banned. Consumers in high income countries gain most from price convergence, while consumers in other countries may be worse off. The total consumer and welfare gains from online market integration are more modest and mainly due to increased product choice rather than reduced price discrimination. (JEL F13, F14, L13, L63, L81)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"37 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136103228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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