皱巴巴的羽毛:美国的鸡肉卡特尔

Q2 Social Sciences Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-01-21 DOI:10.1177/0003603X221149333
Dong Li, Dennis L. Weisman
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引用次数: 1

摘要

美国鸡肉供应商违反《谢尔曼法案》第1条操纵价格的指控可以追溯到半个多世纪前。随着时间的推移,促进这种勾结的方法已经从国家肉鸡营销协会安排的电话会议演变为更复杂的信息共享方法。在近四十年来最高的通货膨胀率和随着国家摆脱疫情而持续存在的供应链瓶颈中,鸡肉行业因垄断定价行为而被政府官员点名。我们研究了“鸡肉卡特尔”形成和维持的机制及其对消费者的有害影响。分析表明,早在2008年,美国鸡肉供应商就策划了一项共谋鸡肉价格的计划。根据一份投诉,这种勾结,加上市场集中度的提高,使鸡肉价格上涨了约50%。相关的消费者盈余损失估计每年为80亿至100亿美元,卡特尔期间的累计损失高达1000亿美元。已经提出了许多起诉,并达成了民事和刑事和解。
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Ruffled Feathers: The Chicken Cartel in the United States
Allegations of price-fixing by U.S. chicken suppliers in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act date back more than a half-century. The methods to facilitate this collusion have evolved over time from conference calls arranged by the National Broiler Marketing Association to more sophisticated methods of information sharing. Amid the highest rate of inflation in nearly forty years and persistent supply-chain bottlenecks as the country emerges from the pandemic, the chicken industry has been singled out by government officials for monopolistic pricing behavior. We examine the mechanism through which the “chicken cartel” was formed and sustained and its harmful effects on consumers. The analysis indicates that as early as 2008 a plan was hatched by U.S. chicken suppliers to collude in fixing the price of chicken. According to one complaint, this collusion, in concert with increased market concentration, raised chicken prices by approximately 50 percent. The associated consumer surplus losses are estimated at $8 to $10 billion annually with cumulative losses over the duration of the cartel ranging upward of $100 billion. Numerous indictments have been handed down and settlements reached, both civil and criminal.
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来源期刊
Antitrust Bulletin
Antitrust Bulletin Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
34
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