选举舞弊的信号游戏:以俄罗斯为例

IF 0.7 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Russian Politics Pub Date : 2022-07-11 DOI:10.30965/24518921-00604018
K. Kalinin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

2000年代以来,俄罗斯的选举变得越来越不自由和不公平,其特点是压制选举竞争,行政干预程度不断上升,选举舞弊现象急剧增加。在本文中,我提出,俄罗斯欺诈选举的模式可以通过将联邦制的观点与克里姆林宫和单一地区州长之间关系的博弈论模型相结合来解释。具体而言,选举舞弊成为地区领导人忠诚的基本信号机制,以及他们控制行政资源以造福克里姆林宫的能力。如果发生选举信号,数据操纵最有可能发生在投票率和选举支持率四舍五入百分比的最后一位0和5,这是向上级报告基本信息的最简单、最容易检测到的方式。根据俄罗斯2000-2018年的选举和财务数据,我的分析显示,有强有力的证据表明,选举后的跨预算转移存在选举舞弊。
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Signaling Games of Election Fraud: A Case of Russia
Over the 2000s Russian elections have become increasingly unfree and unfair, characterized by suppression of electoral competition, rising levels of administrative interference and drastic growth of electoral frauds. In this paper I propose that the pattern of fraudulent elections in Russia can be explained by combining an idea about federalism with a game-theoretic model of the relationship between the Kremlin and a single regional governor. Specifically, election fraud becomes a basic signaling mechanism of regional bosses’ loyalty and of their ability to control the administrative resources to the Kremlin’s benefit. If electoral signaling occurs, data manipulation is most likely to take place with 0s and 5s in the last digit of rounded percentages of turnout and electoral support, which is the easiest and most readily detected way to report basic information to superiors. Based on the Russian electoral and financial data for 2000-2018, my analysis shows strong evidence of election fraud associated with the post-electoral interbudgetary transfers.
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来源期刊
Russian Politics
Russian Politics Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
12.50%
发文量
19
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