Rule Breaking, Bending, and Workarounds: Police Officers and Chiefs’ Coercion-Discretion of Enforcing State Executive Orders

Abstract This study examines rule non-compliance from police officers and managers who decide not to enforce certain public health edicts and decrees. It examines rule non-compliance from police officers and managers who decide not to enforce certain public health edicts and decrees. The locus of our study is the severity of the consequences for rule non-compliance for citizens. We test to see whether rules with severe punishments for citizens are broken, bent, or worked around by the police more often than expected in Bozeman observations. Thirty-seven police chiefs and managers were interviewed. Sixteen focus groups totaling 149 police officers were held in 15 municipalities in a Canadian province. Non-compliance related to police officers not enforcing 1556 Canadian dollars (US$1260; 1082€) fines was high. This study provides credence that workaround is a flexible concept explaining how discretion is used on the frontlines of public service.