网络行业的质量竞争和市场份额领导

IF 0.3 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-02-24 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2020-0188
Yi-Ling Cheng, Ya-Yuan Chan
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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要本文将网络外部性纳入垂直产品差异化模型,考察企业如何决定产品质量和网络规模。我们表明,在质量改善带来显著网络效益的情况下,网络外部性的影响因竞争类型而异。随着网络外部性的增加,垂直产品差异化在价格竞争下扩大,在数量竞争下缩小。此外,在价格竞争下,当网络外部性足够大时,高质量产品的网络规模会增大,而低质量产品的网络规模会减小,从而导致网络规模的领先地位从低质量产品向高质量产品逆转。而在数量竞争下,优质产品和低质产品的网络规模都在增大;此外,如果网络外部性足够大,它们之间的网络规模差距就会缩小。
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Quality Competition and Market-Share Leadership in Network Industries
Abstract This paper incorporates network externalities into a model of vertical product differentiation to examine how firms determine product quality and network size. We show that, with significant network benefits from quality improvement, the effects of network externalities differ depending on the type of competition. In response to an increase in network externalities, vertical product differentiation enlarges under price competition but shrinks under quantity competition. Moreover, under price competition, the network size of a high-quality product increases, whereas that of a low-quality product decreases for a sufficiently large extent of network externalities, resulting in a reversal in the leading position in terms of network size from the low- to the high-quality product. By contrast, the network sizes of high- and low-quality products both increase under quantity competition; moreover, the gap between their network sizes shrinks for a sufficiently large extent of network externalities.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
25.00%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.
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