EXPRESS:多方辛迪加中地位差距和新成员加入的另类中心视角

IF 5.2 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Strategic Organization Pub Date : 2023-08-29 DOI:10.1177/14761270231199760
Steven M. Gray, P. Boumgarden, R. Ranganathan, Laura Huang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

地位动态在风险投资(VC)联合中起着至关重要的作用。先前对多党辛迪加的研究表明,当前辛迪加成员之间的地位差异如何影响辛迪加在随后的投资轮中寻找新投资者。然而,目前尚不清楚潜在的新来者如何根据当前辛迪加成员之间的地位差异程度来评估是否加入辛迪加。我们采用了一种以改变为中心的方法,通过研究现有辛迪加的地位差异如何影响潜在新人的加入意愿。对于潜在的新来者,我们认为辛迪加的地位差距是一把双刃剑,既因为对辛迪加信任度低而阻碍了新来者,又同时吸引了未来获得各种投资机会的新来者。辛迪加地位差异的感知成本是否超过新来者的感知利益,取决于与风险交易相关的风险程度。在两项研究中——一项对193家机构投资者的实地实验和一项对3644个多党辛迪加的档案研究——我们发现,当交易风险较低时,新来者会被辛迪加地位差异所吸引,但当交易风险较高时,他们会对辛迪加身份差异望而却步。我们的论文强调了多党辛迪加的新成员如何在共同投资者的特征和风险交易的特征之间产生复杂的相互作用。
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EXPRESS: An alter-centric perspective of status disparity and newcomer additions in multiparty syndicates
Status dynamics play a critical role in venture capital (VC) syndication. Prior research on multiparty syndicates has shown how status differences among current syndicate members affect how the syndicate searches for new investors in later investment rounds. However, it is unclear how potential newcomers evaluate whether or not to join a syndicate based on the degree of status disparity among current syndicate members. We adopt an alter-centric approach by examining how an existing syndicate’s status disparity affects a potential newcomer’s willingness to join. For potential newcomers, we contend that syndicate status disparity is a double-edged sword, both deterring newcomers due to low perceptions of syndicate trust while simultanously attracting newcomers at the prospect of accessing diverse future investment opportunities. Whether the perceived costs of syndicate status disparity outweigh the perceived benefits for newcomers depends upon the degree of risk associated with the venture deal. Across two studies—a field experiment of 193 institutional investors and an archival study of 3,644 multiparty syndicates—we found that newcomers are attracted to syndicate status disparity when deal risk is low but deterred from syndicate status disparity when deal risk is high. Our paper highlights how newcomer additions to multiparty syndicates entail a complex interplay between features of co-investors and features of the venture deal.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.80
自引率
8.20%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: Strategic Organization is devoted to publishing high-quality, peer-reviewed, discipline-grounded conceptual and empirical research of interest to researchers, teachers, students, and practitioners of strategic management and organization. The journal also aims to be of considerable interest to senior managers in government, industry, and particularly the growing management consulting industry. Strategic Organization provides an international, interdisciplinary forum designed to improve our understanding of the interrelated dynamics of strategic and organizational processes and outcomes.
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