Ambiguity and conflict in pension policies implementation: evidence from China

Abstract While the literature generally acknowledges that target groups affect policy implementation, we argue that a more detailed investigation of the mechanisms and factors associated with such effect is necessary. Drawing on the Ambiguity-Conflict Model, we explore how target groups’ perceived policy ambiguity and conflict relate to the implementation of Corporate Employee Pension (CEP) policies in China. Empirically, we utilize a unique sample of all firms listed on China’s A-stock market from 2008 to 2014 and hypothesize that target groups’ perceived policy ambiguity and conflict negatively associate with the implementation outcomes of the CEP policies in China. Our results confirm such a relationship and suggest that the implementation outcomes, from most favorable to least favorable, follow the order: Administrative Implementation, Political Implementation or Experimental Implementation, and Symbolic Implementation. Such results are robust to both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. Our research offers implications for both scholars and practitioners of pension policies in China.