Two Metaphysics of Freedom: Kant and Hegel on Violence and Law in the Era of the Fall of Liberal Democracy

The article attempts to rethink the legacy of Kant and Hegel in light of the problematic of law, violence and universality. It is also an explication of this legacy in the context of two contemporary insights into historical fate of our Eurocentric civilization—of Achille Mbembe and of Susan Buck-Morss. First, I consider the Kantian foundation of Rechtstaat in the light of Benjamin’s classic Critique of Violence and Mbembe’s contemporary critique of colonial power. Then I propose a new account of the central concept of Hegel’s Logic—i.e. the transition from necessity to freedom— from the same perspective, supplemented with Derrida’s interpretation of Benjamin, and Žižek’s reading of Hegel. The dialectic of modality from Hegel’s Science of Logic seems to be an underappreciated thread in this respect, insofar as Hegel’s idea of universality or freedom is founded on his ontology and critique of law.