市场扩张还是市场窃取?共享单车与网络效应的竞争

IF 2.8 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2021-12-05 DOI:10.1111/1756-2171.12391
Guangyu Cao, G. Jin, Xi Weng, Li-an Zhou
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引用次数: 17

摘要

在中国,最近兴起的无桩共享单车由两家公司主导:一家公司首先在82个城市启动,随后另一家公司进入了其中的59个城市。利用这些变化,我们研究了进入者如何影响在位者的市场绩效。令我们惊讶的是,该公司的进入扩大了现有公司的市场。进入者不仅增加了总出行次数,鼓励更多的自行车投资,而且可以让现有者获得更高的每次出行收益,提高自行车利用率,形成更广泛、更均匀的分布网络。对新用户的市场扩张效应大于对现有老用户的市场窃取效应。这些发现,加上一个强调消费者搜索和网络效应的理论模型,表明具有积极网络效应的市场不一定是赢家通吃的,特别是当用户在兼容网络中多户时。曹光宇曹光华管理学院光华ofo共享经济研究中心北京100871中国cgy1117@pku.edu.cn金哲金马里兰大学经济系315f学院园教学楼20742-7211和美国国家经济研究局jin@econ.umd.edu翁曦北京北京大学光华新楼304室wengxi125@gsm.pku.edu.cn北京大学周丽安管理学院北京100871中国zhoula@gsm.pku.edu.cn
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Market‐expanding or Market‐stealing? Competition with network effects in bike‐sharing
The recent rise of dockless bike-sharing is dominated by two firms in China: one started first in 82 cities, 59 of which were subsequently entered by the second firm. Using these variations, we study how the entrant affects the incumbent's market performance. To our surprise, the entry expands the market for the incumbent. Not only does the entry boost its total number of trips and encourage more bike investment, it but also allows the incumbent to achieve higher revenue per trip, improve bike utilization rate, and form a wider and more evenly distributed network. The market expansion effect on new users dominates a significant market-stealing effect on the incumbent's old users. These findings, together with a theoretical model that highlights consumer search and network effects, suggest that a market with positive network effects is not necessarily winner-takes-all, especially when users multi-home across compatible networks. Guangyu Cao Guanghua School of Management Guanghua-ofo Center for Sharing Economy Resarch Peking University Beijing 100871 China cgy1117@pku.edu.cn Ginger Zhe Jin University of Maryland Department of Economics 3115F Tydings Hall College Park, MD 20742-7211 and NBER jin@econ.umd.edu Xi Weng Room 304, Guanghua New Bldg Peking University Beijing, China wengxi125@gsm.pku.edu.cn Li-An Zhou Guanghua School of Management Peking University Beijing 100871 CHINA zhoula@gsm.pku.edu.cn
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.60
自引率
4.30%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: The RAND Journal of Economics publishes theoretical and empirical research on industrial organization and closely related topics, including contracts, organizations, law and economics, and regulation. The RAND Journal of Economics, formerly the Bell Journal of Economics, is published quarterly by The RAND Corporation, in conjunction with Blackwell Publishing.
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