连续布洛托上校战役的预算和努力选择

IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Cesifo Economic Studies Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI:10.1093/CESIFO/IFY010
Kai A. Konrad
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引用次数: 12

摘要

军事战役被研究为三战三胜制的动态比赛,最终胜利归功于第一个赢得关键数量战斗的玩家。本文研究了在三局三胜制的比赛中,总体预算约束和对特定战斗中使用的军事资源破坏的不同假设如何影响动态和总体平衡资源。如果玩家必须选择一个总体预算,并且可以在战役过程中利用该预算中剩下的资金,那么落后玩家的沮丧效应和战役达到更决定性状态时的决战效应就会消失。无论是在分配给一场战斗的资源被使用的情况下,还是在玩家的战斗资源被转移到未来的战斗中,这都是正确的。如果只有获胜者的比赛资源结转,这将产生领先选手的预防行为,以及落后选手的全面行为。
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Budget and Effort Choice in Sequential Colonel Blotto Campaigns
Military campaigns are studied as dynamic best-of-three contests, where final victory is attributed to the first player who wins a critical number of battles. The article studies how overall budget constraints and different assumptions about the destruction of military resources used in a given battle affect the dynamics and overall equilibrium resources in a best-of-three contest. Discouragement effects for players who lag behind and the showdown effect when the campaign reaches a more decisive state vanish if players have to choose an overall budget and can draw on what is left from this budget in the course of the campaign. This is true both in a context in which the resources allocated to a battle are used up there as well as if player’s battle resources carry over to future battles. If only the winner’s contest resources carryover, this generates precautionary behavior of the leading player and all-in behavior for the player lagging behind.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.70
自引率
7.70%
发文量
11
期刊介绍: CESifo Economic Studies publishes provocative, high-quality papers in economics, with a particular focus on policy issues. Papers by leading academics are written for a wide and global audience, including those in government, business, and academia. The journal combines theory and empirical research in a style accessible to economists across all specialisations.
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