{"title":"美国诉bbb的经济原理","authors":"Germán Bet, R. Blair, J. Donna","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211067116","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an antitrust suit against Google alleging that Google has unlawfully monopolized the markets for general search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising. The complaint raises questions involving market definition, monopoly power, and monopolizing conduct. In this article, we examine these issues through the lens of microeconomic principles. Our analysis finds that there is a sound economic rationale for the DOJ’s complaint.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"23 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Economic Rationale of United States v. Google\",\"authors\":\"Germán Bet, R. Blair, J. Donna\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/0003603X211067116\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an antitrust suit against Google alleging that Google has unlawfully monopolized the markets for general search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising. The complaint raises questions involving market definition, monopoly power, and monopolizing conduct. In this article, we examine these issues through the lens of microeconomic principles. Our analysis finds that there is a sound economic rationale for the DOJ’s complaint.\",\"PeriodicalId\":36832,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Antitrust Bulletin\",\"volume\":\"67 1\",\"pages\":\"23 - 39\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Antitrust Bulletin\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211067116\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Antitrust Bulletin","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211067116","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an antitrust suit against Google alleging that Google has unlawfully monopolized the markets for general search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising. The complaint raises questions involving market definition, monopoly power, and monopolizing conduct. In this article, we examine these issues through the lens of microeconomic principles. Our analysis finds that there is a sound economic rationale for the DOJ’s complaint.
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