刑事和解的文明化

IF 1.6 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW Boston University Law Review Pub Date : 2017-10-22 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2944152
Russell M. Gold, Carissa Byrne Hessick, F. A. Hessick
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These high penalties are, in some instances, legislatively designed to impose the appropriate punishment only when discounted for guilty pleas. Accordingly, a prosecutor seeking to secure a guilty plea may exert significant pressure on a defendant to enter the plea by charging the defendant with an array of crimes with high sentences, and then offering to reduce or dismiss various charges in exchange for a defendant waiving her right to a trial and all of the procedural protections associated with that trial. These advantages give prosecutors the ability virtually to force defendants to enter into plea bargains.The civil system facilitates settlement in a very different way.5 It does not seek to induce settlements by giving the plaintiffthe power to recover disproportionate damages upon a jury verdict. With few exceptions, plaintiffs may recover only compensation for their harms. Instead of handing one side a bludgeon, the civil system encourages settlement through various procedures. 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引用次数: 2

摘要

引言今天的大多数案件都是通过和解解决的。研究表明,超过90%的刑事和民事案件在审判前结案。1人们常说,为了避免司法系统不堪重负,这种高结案率是必要的。尽管和解是刑事和民事制度的规范,但这两种制度以极其不同的方式促进和解。刑事系统通过授权检察官使被告接受审判的代价和被定罪的风险高得令人无法容忍,从而促进和解。3多项法规对类似的不当行为规定了不同的罪行,检察官有权选择对被告提起哪些指控。4此外,对经审判而被定罪的被告人规定的刑罚是非常高的。在某些情况下,这些高额惩罚是立法设计的,目的是只有在认罪时才给予适当的惩罚。因此,寻求认罪的检察官可能会对被告施加巨大压力,要求其认罪,方法是指控被告犯有一系列重罪,然后提出减少或驳回各种指控,以换取被告放弃审判权和与审判相关的所有程序保护。这些优势使检察官实际上有能力迫使被告进行辩诉交易。民事制度以一种非常不同的方式促进和解。5它并不试图通过赋予原告在陪审团裁决后收回不成比例的损害赔偿的权力来诱导和解。除了少数例外,原告只能就其伤害获得赔偿。民事制度鼓励通过各种程序解决问题,而不是向一方施压。其中一些程序,例如要求以替代方式解决争端的规则,直接鼓励解决争端。其他动议,如简易判决动议和审前会议,更间接地促进了和解。他们至少有四种方式。首先,他们改善了各方获取对手案件信息的途径,以便进行更知情的谈判。其次,它们为法官或另一位中立的仲裁者提供了预览她对案情的看法的机会,以帮助debias各方对其案件的看法。第三,它们增加了诉讼成本,从而避免进一步的诉讼程序为双方节省了资金,并创造了讨价还价的范围。第四,它们创造了双方律师同时关注案件的时刻。除了促进和解外,这些程序还通过筛选毫无价值的案件来避免审判,从而减轻被告解决“错误”案件的压力。刑事系统没有类似的程序。大多数司法管辖区没有提供仲裁或调解等程序来鼓励或促进认罪谈判。6相反,包括联邦系统在内的许多司法管辖区禁止司法部门参与认罪谈判。7刑事系统通常也没有提供广泛的信息交流或程序,如简易判决,这有助于debias各方,并迫使他们评估自己案件的实力。刑事系统也缺乏在审判前筛选无价值案件的有效机制。这些缺陷使得刑事制度在产生和解的方式上不如民事制度。首先,刑事制度未能促进知情和解。另一方面,刑事系统经常迫使被告解决毫无价值的案件或进行审判,并面临大幅加重刑期的风险。刑事制度基本上允许检察官选择和解条款,而不是根据被告所犯罪行和对他们不利的证据来为和解提供便利。8因为检察官有太多的影响力,被告往往发现自己无法拒绝甚至糟糕的和解条款并进行审判…
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Civilizing Criminal Settlements
INTRODUCTIONMost cases today are resolved by settlement. Studies suggest that over ninety percent of criminal and civil cases settle before trial.1 This high rate of settlement is necessary, it is often said, to avoid overwhelming the judicial system.Although settlements are the norm in both the criminal and civil systems, the two systems facilitate settlements in extremely different ways. The criminal system promotes settlements by empowering prosecutors to make the price of going to trial and risking conviction intolerably high for defendants.3 Multiple statutes create different crimes for similar misconduct, and the prosecutor has the power to pick which charges to bring against a defendant.4 Moreover, the sentences prescribed for defendants who are convicted after trial are extremely high. These high penalties are, in some instances, legislatively designed to impose the appropriate punishment only when discounted for guilty pleas. Accordingly, a prosecutor seeking to secure a guilty plea may exert significant pressure on a defendant to enter the plea by charging the defendant with an array of crimes with high sentences, and then offering to reduce or dismiss various charges in exchange for a defendant waiving her right to a trial and all of the procedural protections associated with that trial. These advantages give prosecutors the ability virtually to force defendants to enter into plea bargains.The civil system facilitates settlement in a very different way.5 It does not seek to induce settlements by giving the plaintiffthe power to recover disproportionate damages upon a jury verdict. With few exceptions, plaintiffs may recover only compensation for their harms. Instead of handing one side a bludgeon, the civil system encourages settlement through various procedures. Some of these procedures, such as rules requiring alternative dispute resolution, directly encourage settlement. Others, such as motions for summary judgment and pretrial conferences, facilitate settlement more indirectly. They do so in at least four ways. First, they improve the parties' access to information about their adversaries' case to allow for more informed bargaining. Second, they provide opportunities for the judge or another neutral arbiter to preview her view of the merits to help debias the parties' views of their case. Third, they increase the costs of litigation such that avoiding further procedure saves money for both sides and creates a bargaining range. Fourth, they create moments in which attorneys from both sides simultaneously focus on the case. In addition to facilitating settlements, these procedures help avoid trials by screening out meritless cases, thereby alleviating pressure on defendants to settle the "wrong" cases.The criminal system does not have similar procedures. Most jurisdictions provide no procedures, such as arbitration or mediation, to encourage or facilitate plea bargaining.6 To the contrary, many jurisdictions, including the federal system, bar judicial involvement during plea negotiations.7 Nor do criminal systems generally provide for broad exchanges of information or have procedures, such as summary judgment, that help to debias the parties and force them to assess the strength of their case. The criminal system also lacks effective mechanisms to screen out meritless cases prior to trial.These deficiencies make the criminal system inferior to the civil system in the way that it produces settlements. For one thing, the criminal system fails to facilitate informed settlements. For another, the criminal system regularly forces defendants to settle meritless cases or proceed to trial and risk substantially greater sentences. Rather than facilitating settlements based on the crimes defendants committed and the strength of the evidence against them, the criminal system essentially allows prosecutors to choose the terms of settlement.8 Because prosecutors have so much leverage, defendants often find themselves unable to turn down even poor settlement terms and proceed to trial. …
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期刊介绍: The Boston University Law Review provides analysis and commentary on all areas of the law. Published six times a year, the Law Review contains articles contributed by law professors and practicing attorneys from all over the world, along with notes written by student members.
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