以国家安全之名:外资收购保护与企业创新效率

IF 5.7 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Global Strategy Journal Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI:10.1002/gsj.1440
Wei Shi, Boshuo Li
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本研究考察了投资相关国家安全审查法律法规引发的外资收购保护对企业创新效率的影响。根据代理理论,我们认为外国收购保护的增加可能会导致创新效率的降低——创新产出相对于创新投入的数量——通过鼓励管理堑壕,可能导致研发资源的无效配置和使用。在外部治理行为者——专门的机构投资者和金融分析师——的监督下,这种影响会减弱。以美国《外国投资与国家安全法》的颁布为实证背景,我们找到了支持我们论点的证据。许多国家制定了与投资有关的国家安全审查法律法规,以保护国内高科技公司不受外国收购。尽管这些法律法规的目标是保持国家在全球创新中的领导地位,但它可能会无意中导致企业创新效率的降低——将创新投入转化为产出的有效性——通过鼓励可能导致研发资源分配和使用无效的管理壕沟。当其他外部治理参与者(如专门的机构投资者和金融分析师)对管理者施加更强的监督时,这种效果就会减弱。我们的论点得到了在美国颁布《外国投资与国家安全法》背景下的实证分析的支持。
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In the name of national security: Foreign takeover protection and firm innovation efficiency

Research Summary

This study investigates the influence of foreign takeover protection triggered by investment-related national security screening laws and regulations on firm innovation efficiency. Drawing on agency theory, we argue that an increase in foreign takeover protection can lead to a reduction in innovation efficiency—the amount of innovation output relative to innovation input—by encouraging managerial entrenchment that can result in ineffective allocation and use of R&D resources. Such effects are weaker in the presence of monitoring from external governance actors—dedicated institutional investors and financial analysts. Using the enactment of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act in the United States as our empirical context, we find support for our arguments.

Managerial Summary

Many countries have enacted investment-related national security screening laws and regulations to protect domestic high-tech firms from foreign acquisitions. Although the goal of these laws and regulations is to retain the country's leadership position in global innovation, it may unintendedly lead to a reduction in firm innovation efficiency—the effectiveness in transforming innovation input to output—by encouraging managerial entrenchment that can give rise to ineffective allocation and use of R&D resources. Such effect is weaker when other external governance actors, such as dedicated institutional investors and financial analysts, impose stronger monitoring on managers. Our arguments are supported by empirical analyses in the context of the enactment of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act in the United States.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.20
自引率
11.80%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: The Global Strategy Journal is a premier platform dedicated to publishing highly influential managerially-oriented global strategy research worldwide. Covering themes such as international and global strategy, assembling the global enterprise, and strategic management, GSJ plays a vital role in advancing our understanding of global business dynamics.
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