信任、不信任和“医用煤气灯”

IF 1.1 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-04-07 DOI:10.1093/pq/pqad035
Elizabeth Barnes
{"title":"信任、不信任和“医用煤气灯”","authors":"Elizabeth Barnes","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad035","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n When are we obligated to believe someone? To what extent are people authorities about their own experiences? What kind of harm might we enact when we doubt? Questions like these lie at the heart of many debates in social and feminist epistemology, and they’re the driving issue behind a key conceptual framework in these debates—gaslighting. But while the concept of gaslighting has provided fruitful insight, it's also proven somewhat difficult to adjudicate, and seems prone to over-application. In what follows, I argue that Katherine Hawley's theory of trust can provide a useful alternative lens for looking at contested testimony. To do this, I focus on a particularly complex—but increasingly popular—application of gaslighting: the physician/patient relationship, and the idea of ‘medical gaslighting’. I argue that, even though patients can experience harm when they are disbelieved, there are nevertheless good reasons for physicians not to trust patients about at least some of their own narratives.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Trust, Distrust, and ‘Medical Gaslighting’\",\"authors\":\"Elizabeth Barnes\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/pq/pqad035\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n When are we obligated to believe someone? To what extent are people authorities about their own experiences? What kind of harm might we enact when we doubt? Questions like these lie at the heart of many debates in social and feminist epistemology, and they’re the driving issue behind a key conceptual framework in these debates—gaslighting. But while the concept of gaslighting has provided fruitful insight, it's also proven somewhat difficult to adjudicate, and seems prone to over-application. In what follows, I argue that Katherine Hawley's theory of trust can provide a useful alternative lens for looking at contested testimony. To do this, I focus on a particularly complex—but increasingly popular—application of gaslighting: the physician/patient relationship, and the idea of ‘medical gaslighting’. I argue that, even though patients can experience harm when they are disbelieved, there are nevertheless good reasons for physicians not to trust patients about at least some of their own narratives.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47749,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-04-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad035\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad035","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

摘要

我们什么时候有义务相信某人?人们对自己的经历有多权威?当我们怀疑时,会造成什么样的伤害?像这样的问题是社会和女权主义认识论中许多辩论的核心,也是这些辩论中一个关键概念框架——煤气灯背后的驱动问题。但是,尽管煤气灯的概念提供了丰富的见解,但事实证明,它也有点难以裁决,而且似乎容易被过度应用。在下文中,我认为凯瑟琳·霍利的信任理论可以为研究有争议的证词提供一个有用的替代视角。为了做到这一点,我专注于煤气灯的一个特别复杂但越来越受欢迎的应用:医生/患者关系,以及“医疗煤气灯”的概念。我认为,尽管患者在不相信的时候可能会受到伤害,但医生有充分的理由不相信患者自己的一些说法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Trust, Distrust, and ‘Medical Gaslighting’
When are we obligated to believe someone? To what extent are people authorities about their own experiences? What kind of harm might we enact when we doubt? Questions like these lie at the heart of many debates in social and feminist epistemology, and they’re the driving issue behind a key conceptual framework in these debates—gaslighting. But while the concept of gaslighting has provided fruitful insight, it's also proven somewhat difficult to adjudicate, and seems prone to over-application. In what follows, I argue that Katherine Hawley's theory of trust can provide a useful alternative lens for looking at contested testimony. To do this, I focus on a particularly complex—but increasingly popular—application of gaslighting: the physician/patient relationship, and the idea of ‘medical gaslighting’. I argue that, even though patients can experience harm when they are disbelieved, there are nevertheless good reasons for physicians not to trust patients about at least some of their own narratives.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
73
期刊介绍: The Philosophical Quarterly is one of the most highly regarded and established academic journals in philosophy. In an age of increasing specialism, it remains committed to publishing high-quality articles from leading international scholars across the range of philosophical study. Accessibility of its content for all philosophers - including students - is an editorial priority. The Philosophical Quarterly regularly publishes articles, discussions and reviews, and runs an annual Essay Prize. Its distinguished international contributors engage with both the established and the new, for example, through reflection on cognitive psychology, decision theory, quantum mechanics.
期刊最新文献
The Unity of Perceptual Content Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference A Fitting Definition of Epistemic Emotions Group Responsibility and Historicism Self-Effacing Reasons and Epistemic Constraints: Some Lessons from the Knowability Paradox
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1