在没有相互排他性专利的情况下逐步创新:对倒置U的启示

IF 0.3 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-06-16 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2021-0112
Norman H. Sedgley
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要逐步创新模型是研究竞争与创新关系的基准模型。该模型假设一个行业可以处于两种状态之一;平整的或未平整的。在一个不平衡的状态下,落后的公司是唯一的创新者。在一个公平的州里,公司在专利竞争中竞争。在这场专利竞赛中,成功的创新概率是相互排斥的。这个公式提供了数学上的易处理性,但它没有其他理由。我放松了这一假设,并使用数值模拟来证明,允许创新中的非互斥成功对倒U关系具有重要影响。倒U型关系不再是对模型的预测。此外,该模型预测,专利措施将低估来自水平状态的创新,允许在一组狭窄的参数限制下,竞争和专利之间存在倒U关系。这一理论练习对理解这一主题的实证记录的现状具有重要意义。
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Step by Step Innovation without Mutually Exclusive Patenting: Implications for the Inverted U
Abstract The step by step model of innovation is a benchmark model in research investigating the relationship between competition and innovation. The model assumes an industry can be in one of two states; leveled or unleveled. In an unleveled state the lagging firm is the only innovator. In a leveled state firms compete in a patent race. In this patent race successful innovation probabilities are mutually exclusive. This formulation provides mathematical tractability, but it has no other justification. I relax this assumption and use numerical simulation to demonstrate that allowing for non mutually exclusive success in innovation has important consequences for the inverted U relationship. The inverted U relationship is no longer a prediction of the model. In addition, the model predicts that patent measures will under count innovation from the leveled state, allowing for an inverted U relationship between competition and patenting under a narrow set of parameter restrictions. This theoretical exercise has important implications for understanding the current state of the empirical record on this topic.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
25.00%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.
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